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Robert H. Mow, Jr.
For several years the organized professions in the United States
have waged a battle for tax equality under the internal revenue
codes.' Until 1961 these efforts had produced little except frustra-
tion; however, since that time, there has been a veritable shower of
new state statutes dealing with this problem.! The new enactments
purport to grant the desired relief through anomalous creatures
called "professional associations" and "professional corporations."
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the new statutes critically
in their legal and ethical contexts.
For the sake of brevity, the following terms will hereafter be
used as defined:
(a) articles-The Articles of Association or the Certificate of
Incorporation.
(b) certificate-A certificate issued by a state board ' which ac-
knowledges the registration of a professional corporation or
professional association and approves the named stockholders
or members as duly licensed practitioners of that profession."
(c) employees-Persons in the professional corporation or pro-
fessional association who render the professional services. Ad-
ministrative assistants such as secretaries and bookkeepers are
not included within this term.'
(d) Kintner Regs-The 1960 Treasury Regulations which provide
the tests for determining when an organization can be taxed
as a corporation.
(e) professional man or practitioner-A licensed person who is
considered to be practicing a learned profession under the
'See Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 353 (1959); MacKay,
Pension Plans and Associations Taxable as Corporations for Professional Persons, 10 Sw. L.J.
281 (1956); Rapp, Quest for Tax Equality for Private Pension Plans: A Short History of
the Jenkins-Keogh Bill, 14 Tax L. Rev. 55 (1959); Wormser, A Plea for Professional
Incorporation Laws, 46 A.B.A.J. 755 (1960).
'See infra the Chart. For the purposes of this Comment, Texas has been classified as
a state which allows the formation of a professional association. For the views of the drafts-
man of the Texas provision see Bromberg, Texas Uniform Partnership Act-The Enacted
Version, 15 Sw. L.J. 386, 387-89 (1961).
a See "(g)," which follows in the text.
'See, e.g., Medical Corp. Act § 5, 4 P-H Corp. Serv. S.D. 87 (1961).
'For a similar definition see Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4306
(Supp. 1961).
"Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, -2 (1960).
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laws of a particular state and under the regulation of a state
board. The phrase usually includes, but is not necessarily
limited to, such persons as accountants, dentists, lawyers, and
physicians. As to whether other professions, such as optometry,
are included, the laws of each particular state must be con-
sulted. The terms do not include tradesmen such as electricians,
barbers, or plumbers.
(f) professional relationship-The relationship of trust and confi-
dence which exists between an individual practitioner and his
client or patient.
(g) state board-The particular group or groups within each state
which regulate and govern the activities, ethics, and licensing
of a particular profession, e.g., a medical licensing board and
a state supreme court.
I. BACKGROUND
For years professional men have objected to internal revenue
code provisions which discriminate against the self-employed.! The
provisions objected to are those which grant substantial tax-savings
in the area of deferred compensation and profit sharing plans solely
to those persons who are employed by others.! Under current law,
for example, an employer can establish a "qualified" employee pen-
sion or profit sharing plan and deduct all payments which are made
to that plan. 0 The trust which holds these funds and accumulates
income is not taxed; 1 and the beneficiary-employee is taxed only
when the benefits are distributed at his death or retirement-and
then possibly at capital gain rates.1" Even principal shareholders of
a corporation can reap these benefits since they can qualify as
employees and thereby participate in the plans. 3 However, pro-
fessional men have been denied similar benefits for two reasons: first,
state laws and ethical considerations have prevented them from
incorporating; 4 and second, federal tax laws have prevented partners
of a professional partnership (the type of business association most
common among practitioners) from considering themselves as em-
'For a similar definition see Professional Corp. Act, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, 5 803 (c)
(Supp. 1961).
'See authorities cited note 1 supra.
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §.J 401-04.
"
0 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 404.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 501.
tint. Rev. Code of 1954, § 402(a) (2). See Treas. Reg. § 1.403 (a)-2 (1956).
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401; see Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(3) (1958) and §
1.402(a)-i (1956). The deduction for contributions is allowable only if the contribution
meets the test of S 162 of the Code of being reasonable additional compensation.
"4See cases cited notes 143, 151, 161, and 178 infra and accompanying text.
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ployees of the partnership for purposes of establishing a qualified
pension or profit sharing plan.15 Accordingly, a practitioner is not
allowed a deduction for funds contributed to a retirement plan;
the funds cannot grow through tax-free accumulation; and they
cannot be recovered at capital gain rates.
Practitioners have attempted in two ways to eliminate this in-
equality. The more direct approach has consisted of efforts to amend
the pertinent portions of the Internal Revenue Code to authorize
qualified pension and profit sharing plans for self-employed persons.
These efforts have been evidenced by the Keogh Bill,"6 which in the
most recent form would allow any self-employed individual to con-
sider himself his own employee for purposes of establishing a quali-
fied plan. 7 Under this bill a self-employed person would be per-
mitted to deduct the lesser of ten per cent of his income or $2,500
per year to set aside tax free for investment in a pension plan; how-
ever, the bill fails to provide capital gain opportunities for the
beneficiary when he receives the money. Because of past opposition
from the Treasury Department-motivated by fear of a loss of
revenue---the Keogh Bill has never been enacted. Since the current
Bill incorporates several changes suggested by the Treasury itself,' a
similar measure may be adopted in the near future. However, to
date this approach has offered no relief to practitioners.
The second, less direct approach to the problem has been repre-
sented by efforts to create organizations which under state law would
be treated as partnerships but which under the Internal Revenue
Code would be classified as associations and, therefore, taxed as cor-
"9 Pension and profit sharing plans are normally not very attractive to any partnerships
due to the requirement that payments to the plan be made for the sole benefit of the
employees. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401 (a). This precludes general partners since
they cannot qualify as employees, Rev. Rul. 61-157, Part 2(e)(1), 1961-35 Int. Rev.
Bull. 9; I.T. 3350, 1940-1 Cum. Bull. 64, and as an employer, a partner cannot participate
in the plan, P.S. No. 23 (1944); Rev. Rul. 33, Part 2(b) (1), 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 267, 269.
"6 For a good history of these attempts see Rapp, supra note 1; Rapp, Pensions for the
Self-Employed: The Treasury Department-Finance Committee Plan, 16 Tax L. Rev. 227
(1961).
17 H.R. 10, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). This bill passed the House in 1961 and was
also approved by the Senate Finance Committee with some modifications. S. Rep. No. 992,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
16H.R. 10, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The Senate version reduced the maximum
deduction to $1750, but it left the total allowable investment at the $2500 figure. S. Rep.
No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
" Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10, 12 (1955); see Rapp, supra notes 1, 16.
" E.g., making the pension plan cover other employees of the self-employed, allowing
self-employed to treat themselves as their own employees thereby keeping the plan within
the framework of § 401-04 of the Code. See Rapp, supra notes 1, 16, and Hearings on
Pension Plans for Owner-Managers of Corporations Before the Senate Finance Committee,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960).
[ Vol. 16
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porations.2' The 1954 case of United States v. Kintner,"2 which per-
mitted an association of doctors to be taxed as a corporation,
aroused hopes that this method would be successful. However, the
Treasury indicated that it would not follow the Kintner ruling23
and that it would publish its own list of criteria to use in determining
whether an organization could be taxed as a corporation.24 Regula-
tions were proposed in December 19592' and finally promulgated in
November 1960.26 Even though the Regulations came soon after
Galt v. United States, 7 where another association of doctors obtained
court approval for tax treatment as a corporation, they indicated
that the Internal Revenue Service did not intend to allow "Kintner
associations" to be taxed as corporations. 8 Consequently, in the
latter part of 1960, practitioners were faced with bleak prospects
in their search for tax equality via this approach.
1 The reason for forming an association which would be treated as a partnership under
state law was to avoid the legal prohibitions on incorporation by professionals, see cases
cited notes 143, 151, 161, and 178 infra, yet still qualify for corporate tax treatment
under the internal revenue codes. An association may be taxed as a corporation under
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701 (A) (3), which reads: "Corporation-the term 'corporation'
includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies." Previous revenue
and tax acts contained identical definitions. See Rev. Act of 1918, § 1; Rev. Act of 1926,
§ 2(a)(2); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3797(a) (3).
Initially it was the Commissioner who was successful in asserting that associations of
professional men with numerous corporate characteristics would be taxed as corporations.
See Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936) (a business trust composed of
doctors held taxable as a corporation). For situations where non-professional taxpayers were
likewise unsuccessful in retaining state classifications as partnerships under the federal
tax laws see Burk-Waggoner Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925) (unincorporated
joint-stock company treated as a partnership under Texas law was held taxable as a
corporation under federal law); Wholesalers Adjustment Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 156
(8th Cir. 1937); cf. Tyrrell v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 500 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 747 (1937). Recently the same argument has been used with success against the
Commissioner. See cases cited notes 22, 27 infra.
The purpose in seeking to be taxed on income as a corporation is that all other corporate
tax consequences follow, e.g., the right to establish qualified pension plans. See Tyrrell v. Com-
missioner, supra at 501. For other tax advantages which can be gained by a corporate-type
organization see Eber, Professional Service Corporations, 100 Trusts & Estates 758 (1961);
Wilson, Professional Associations Taxable as Corporations, 5 Texas 8th Inst. on Current
Tax Hazards 1 (1960); P-H Pens. & Prof. Sh. Rep. 5 44.1 (1961).
2' 2 1 6 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), affirming 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952).
23 Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 598.
24 Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 886-87. The Treasury also indicated that it
did not consider the establishment of a pension plan to be indicative of whether an
organization would be taxed as a corporation. Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 886-87.
" Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, -2, 24 Fed. Reg. 10450 (1959).
"
5 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, -2 (1960).
7 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959), noted, 12 Ala. L. Rev. 415 (1960); 14 Okla.
L. Rev. 99 (1961).
21 In states which had enacted the Uniform Partnership Act, it would have been very
difficult for an organization, which was treated in that state as a partnership, to be
treated as a corporation under the Regulations. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b) (3),
-2(c)(4), -2(d)(1) (1960); Wolfman & Price, Qualifying Under Final Kintner Rules
Will Be Difficult in Most States, 14 J. Taxation 105 (1961); Ray, Corporate Tax Treatment
of Medical Clinics Organized as Associations, 39 Taxes 73 (1961).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The final Regulations were promulgated only a short time before
the first "professional corporation" statute was enacted. 9 Indeed, it
was no accident that there was such proximity in time, for a combi-
nation of two stimulants, one originating in the Treasury Regula-
tions, and one emerging from the professions, induced the state
legislatures to take immediate action.
The first stimulant consisted of the emphasis which the final
Regulations placed on state law in determining the tax status of
unincorporated associations. For tax purposes classification of an
orginizaton as a corporation ordinarily depends on federal law."0
Similarly, in order to ascertain what constitutes a "tax corporation"
under the Regulations, one must look to six criteria which federal
courts have considered indicative of the true nature of a corpora-
tion.' However, in an attempt to clarify further the tests to be
used, the Regulations provide that state law will determine whether
an organization has the necessary internal relationshios to comply
with each of the six criteria." Therefore, the controlling question
in every instance is: What do the state laws permit? Thus, in late
1960 corporate tax status for professional men appeared to be no
further away than the modification of existing state statutes to per-
mit the necessary internal relationships.
The second stimulant consisted of the enthusiastic efforts on the
part of the lobbies of professional societies to secure passage of the
statutes. Several factors motivated this enthusiasm." First, there was
a general feelinz of frustration because of the failure of the Congress
to enact the "Keogh Bill" and thereby to give professional men
some measure of tax relief.' Second, there was undoubtedly resent-
2South Dakota enacted the first statute on Feb. 25, 1961.
" See, e.g., United States v. Kintner. 216 F.2d 418, 424 (9th Cir. 1954). Indeed, the
Regrlat;ons themselves assert this principle. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (c) (1960).
3 The landmark case which first established the rudiments of the current tests was
Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), where a "trust" organized to operate a
golf course was classified as an association and taxed as a corporation at the instance of
the Commissioner. The Supreme Court found the "trust" was more like a corporation
because (1) it was a joint enterprise for the transaction of business, (2) it had centralized
management, (3) it had continuous life in spite of the death of the beneficiaries, (4) in-
terests in the trust could be transferred, and (5) the beneficiaries had limited liability.
These same criteria were used by other cases following Morrissey. See, e.g., United States
v. Kintner, supra note 30, at 423-24; Tyrrell v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 500, 501 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 747 (1937); Pe!ton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
22Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (c) (1960).
23 The American Medical Association was very helpful in producing the quick results.
That organization drafted and sent to all of its state societies a model bill for enactment
of a professional corporation law. This may explain the many similarities among the
statutes. See Report of the Law Department of the Legal and Socio-Economic Division of
the Board of Trustees of the AMA, 178 J.A.M.A. 170 (1961).
"




ment toward the Treasury Department because of its efforts to
repudiate the "Kintner associations."35 Third, there had already been
specific proposals for new enactments which would permit forma-
tion of "professional associations" and "professional corporations. '"32
Therefore, it is not surprising that when the Treasury indicated that
state law would play a vital role in obtaining corporate tax treat-
ment for professional organizations, representatives of the profes-
sions were well equipped to encourage the necessary legislation.
II. CURRENT TAX ASPECTS OF A
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION OR PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
The Kintner Regulations specify six "major" corporate charac-
teristics which are to be used to determine if an organization will
be classified as a partnership or as a corporation for tax purposes."7
To be considered a "corporation" under the Regulations, an organi-
zation should have the following "major" characteristics: (1)
"associates" in the business; (2) an objective to carry on a business
for joint profit; (3) continuity of life; (4) centralization of man-
agement; (5) limited liability; and (6) free transferability of
interests." Because the first two criteria are considered common to
both partnerships and corporations,39 the crucial characteristics are
the remaining four. Therefore, in order to be taxed as a corporation,
an organization must be more corporate than non-corporate in nature
as measured primarily by those four criteria.'
" See generally the sources cited note 1 supra.
" See Jones, supra note 1 (Many of the suggestions made by Jones have been adopted
in the recent statutes.); Jones, Should Lawyers Incorporate? 11 Hastings L.J. 150 (1960);
Wormser, supra note 1.
3'"There are a number of major characteristics ordinarily found in a pure corporation
which, taken together distinguish it from other organizations." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(a)(1) (1960).
3 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960). It should be noted that the author is not
neces.arily in agreement with the Treasury that the "characteristics" listed are "distinguish-
ing" features of a corporation. Indeed, some types of corporations may not have one or
more of these "major" characteristics. For example, a non-profit corporation obviously
is not designed to produce a profit; and, therefore, it cannot qualify as a "tax corporation"
since it lacks the characteristic of "an objective to carry on a business for joint profit."
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2) (1960). Yet it is nonetheless a corporation. More-
over, a non-profit corporation probably will not have "free transferability of interests"
since by its nature it may not even have "interests." See Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act
art. 2.24 (Supp. 1961). Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that there be individual
liability of shareholders in a corporation. See 1 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 20
(perm. ed. 1931); Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870).
Finally, there certainly may be corporations with restrictions on the "free" transferability
of shares, especially in a closely-held organization. See 1 Fletcher, supra; Palmer v.
Chamberlin, 191 F.2d $32 (5th Cir. 1951). While some such restrictions may be considered
"unreasonable," it is normally the restriction which is declared invalid, and not the
corporation.3 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1960).
40 Treas. Reg. S 301.7701-2 (a) (3) (1960).
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After the promulgation of the Regulations in 1960, there was
the immediate reaction by professional groups on the state level. In
1961 special bills were introduced in twenty-two legislatures."
Fourteen states subsequently enacted laws which appeared to satisfy
the tax requirements through the creation of professional associations
and professional corporations." In subsections A and B of this
section, an attempt will be made to analyze these new statutes
graphically and critically vis-a-vis the Treasury Regulations.
A. The State Laws-Examined Graphically
This subsection deals with the graphical analysis. Therefore, in
the Chart on the following pages the provisions of the statutes of
each state are classified according to their relation to one of the four
"major" corporate characteristics which are considered to be crucial
under the Kintner Regulations.'
B. The State Laws And The Treasury
Regulations-Analyzed Critically
In this subsection the following form is used: first, one of the four
"major" corporate criteria is in part reprinted from the Regulations;
second, that particular criteria is discussed briefly; third, the state
statutes are analyzed with respect to their satisfaction of that criteria.
1. Continuity of Life
(1) An organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity,
4 P-H Pens. & Prof. Sh. Rep. 5 54.3 (1961). So far in 1962 some seven states have
also enacted or at least considered enacting some form of a professional association or
professional corporation bill. See Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.4 See infra the Chart. The states which have enacted laws in 1962 are: Arizona,
Kentucky, South Carolina, and Virginia. See Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1962, p. 1,
col. 1. Nebraska apparently has allowed medical corporations under her case law prior
to this time. See the Nebraska cases cited notes 143, 150 infra. The Colorado Supreme
Court by unilateral action has ruled that attorneys may incorporate, Colo. Sup. Ct. R.
231 (1962), and the Missouri Attorney-General recently ruled that physicians could
incorporate in that state, Op. Att'y Gen. No. 8 (Mar. 15, 1962).
There is little denial of the fact that these organizations are being created solely in
response to the tax regulations. In the Florida case which approved professional service
corporations for lawyers, the supreme court of that state recognized that the principal
reason for the enactments was to allow qualification under Treasury Regulation 5
301.7701-2. (1960). The court in ruling that such attempts were not "devious" said:
We construe the legislation . . . as a frank and forthright effort to adapt
certain business and professional relationships to the requirements of the
Internal Revenue Service in order that the members of such businesses or
professions may be placed on an equal footing with other taxpayers. In re
Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, $56 (Fla. 1961).
4 The Connecticut Medical Group Clinic Corporation Act (enacted in 1951) is
analyzed herein for purposes of comparison with the other statutes, since a clinic organized
under that Act was approved for corporate tax treatment early in 1961. For the text
of the act see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-180 (Rev. of 1958, rev. to 1962). For the
tax "ruling" see Letter from John S. Littleton, Director, Tax Rulings Div., Comm'r of
Int. Rev., to Reid & Riege, P-H Pen. & Prof. Sh. Rep. 5 11979 (1961).
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bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will
not cause a dissolution of the organization. On the other hand, if the
death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of
any member will cause a dissolution of the organization, continuity of
life does not exist ...
(2) For purposes of this paragraph, dissolution of an organization
means an alteration of the identity of an organization by reason of a
change in the relationship between its members as determined under
local law. For example, since the resignation of a partner from a
general partnership destroys the mutual agency which exists between
such partner and his copartners and thereby alters the personal relation
between the partners which constitutes the identity of the partner-
ship itself, the resignation of a partner dissolves the partnership. A
corporation, however, has a continuing identity which is detached from
the relationship between its stockholders."
a. Comments on the "Continuity" Requirement.-This require-
ment has been criticized for taking a somewhat technical viewpoint,"
one that is inconsistent with Galt v. United States" and the Uniform
Partnership Act (hereafter referred to as the "UPA"). The objec-
tion is that the Treasury has placed too much emphasis upon an
individual member's power to "dissolve" the partnership and too
little emphasis upon the fact that in the vast majority of cases a
partnership does not lose its identity nor its right to carry on busi-
ness just because of a "dissolution."4 ' Though there are many ways
by which a partnership may be "dissolved" under the UPA, in most
instances the organization which remains after "dissolution" may
legally continue to transact business (until termination and liquida-
tion) if the agreement so provides.48 Thus, in spite of the power of
44Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1960).
41See MacKay, Professional Associations Instead of Partnerships, 10 Tul. Tax Inst.
409, 422-23, 434 (1961); AMA Objections to Parts of Proposed "Kintner" Regs., CCH
1960 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 5 8770A.
48 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959). Galt impliedly recognized that the agreement
(articles of association) can provide the necessary "continuity of life" of an organization
irrespective of how the organization was treated under local laws. The court of appeals
in the Kintner case likewise recognized "continuity" by contract by approving the hold-
ing of the district court. For the ruling of the district court see Kintner v. United States,
107 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Mont. 1952); for the appellate decision see United States v.
Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
4' See MacKay, supra note 45, at 422-23.
" Dissolution is defined as the change in the relations of the partners caused by any
partner's ceasing to be associated in the carrying on of the business. UPA § 29. The
effect of the dissolution is that the partnership is not terminated but continues until the
winding up and liquidation. UPA § 30. Any continuation of the business after expiration
of a term is prima facie a continuation of the partnership. UPA § 23(b). Despite the dis-
solution effected by the causes listed in § 31, with the exception of where the business is
unlawful, the provisions of § 41 imply that there is the power to continue the business.
Also, § 35(1) (b) gives the remaining partners the power to continue to bind each other
to third parties without actual notice in the case of any dissolution. UPA § 41(6) implies
that the admission or the retirement of any partner causes a dissolution. It is believed that
STATE CENTRALIZATION OF
1) TYPE CONTINUITY OF LIFE MANAGEMENT
2) OPEN TO
ALA.' 1) Continues despite death, insanity, resig- I) Governed by a Board of GoN
nation, or bankruptcy of a member un- elected by members, and by
1) Ass'n 5 1 til dissolved by a V3 vote of the mem- selected by the Board. § 7.
bers. § 8. 2) No member can bind the asso
2) All § 2 2) No member can dissolve, nor does trans- within the scope of the associ
fer of stock dissolve. 5 8. business solely by virtue of his
3) The Attorney General may dissolve for a member. § 7.
failure of the association to remove a 3) Members of the Board and officei
disqualified member or employee. 5 10. not be members of the associatic
cept unlicensed officers and Boarc
hers cannot participate in dc
constituting the practice of th
fession. S 7.
ARK.
2  1) The BCA is applicable to these corpora- 1) The organization is governed 1
tions. 5 3. (Business Corporation Act) BCA, and all powers, privilege
1) Corp. 5 2 2) Annual registration and renewal of the duties are determined by this st-
certificate is required. 5 6. 5 3.
2) Dentists & 3) The State Board may revoke the certifi-
Physicians cate for any one of four reasons. 3 5 10.
§52
CONN.4  1) The Articles must provide "continuity 1) The Articles must provide "cent
of life so that the death, insanity, bank- management so that any one o
I) Ass'n 5 ruptcy, retirement, resignation, or ex- but less than all of the memb
34-82(1) pulsion of any member will not cause a continuing exclusive authority t
dissolution." § 34-82(1) (a). management decisions necessary
2) All 5 2) The Articles shall be cancelled "when conduct of the professional t
34-82(1) the association is dissolved by all of its for which the association was I
members or as otherwise provided in the and so that no member of the
Articles." s 34-82(4). tion, acting without the autho
the managing member or m
3) Before dissolution iseffective the agree- shall have the power to bind tih
ment of such action must be filed with ciation by his act." § 34-82(1)
the Secretary of State, and filed for rec-
ord with the town clerk. S 34-82(5).
All Alabama section numbers refer to the Professional Ass'n Act, 2 P-H Corp. Serv.
Ala. 221-24 (1961).
All Arkansas section numbers refer either to the Dental Corp. Act or to the Medical
Corp. Act (the acts are identical except in name and profession affected). See Dental Corp.
Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. §5 64-1701 to -1717 (Supp. 1961); Medical Corp. Act, Ark. Stat.
Ann. 55 64-1801 to -1717 (Supp. 1961).
a The state board may revoke the certificate for:
1) failure of the corporation to remove a disqualified member, agent, officer,
or employee;
2) failure of the corporation to remove any person guilty of unethical con-
duct;
3) lack of surviving shareholders, i.e., death of the last shareholder;
4) failure of the corporation to comply with state board regulations.
4 All Connecticut section numbers in this panel refer to Conn. Gen. Stat. S 34-82
(Rev. of 1958, rev. to 1962).
NSFERABILITY OF INTERESTS
members or shareholders must be 1) The professional relationship is to remain
' licensed. § 9. unchanged. § 6.
res of stock or certificates of mem- 2) There is no individual liability for debts
;hip are freely transferable unless the of, or claims against the association, un-
icles otherwise lawfully restrict. § 9. less the individual personally participated
in the transaction. §6.
"officers, directors, and shareholders" 1) The act does not alter "any law appli-
;t be licensed. No unlicensed person cable to the relationship between a den-
have any part in the ownership, tist (doctor) furnishing dental (medi-
sagement, or control of the corpora- cal) service and a person receiving such
k. § 14. service, including the liability arising out
!re is no other provision except that of such service." 5 15.
corporation enjoys the powers and 2) The BCA controls in areas not otherwise
rileges given under the BCA. § 3. specified in the act. § 3.
Articles must provide one of two 1) The Articles must provide "limited lia-
es:
"free transferability" so that the
dominant interest-holding members
may transfer to an unassociated li-
censed person without the consent of
others; or
"modified transferability" so that
after first offering to current mem-
bers at fair market value, a member
may then transfer to an unassociated
licensed person. § 34-82(1) (d).
bility so that the individual members of
the association shall not be individually
or severally liable for its debts; provided,
however, the members shall in no way
limit their individual or several liability
in the Articles of Association or other-
wise, for any acts of reckless or wanton
conduct, negligence, malpractice, profes-




1) TYPE CONTINUITY OF LIFE CENTRALIZATION OF
2) OPEN TO MANAGEMENT
CONN." 1) The corporation has perpetual succession 1) The organization could have ti
by corporate name unless a limited period type management as any no
1) Corp. 5 is stated in the Articles. § 33-428(c). corporation under the Non-Stoc
33-180 2) There may be dissolution by a) resolu- poration Act. § 33-442 to -45;
tion; b) expiration of the period speci-2) Physicians fled in the Articles; c) decree of dissolu-
5 33-180 tion in judicial proceedings to liquidate;
d) forfeiture action by the Secretary of
State or quo warranto by the Attorney
General. § 33-484.
FLA.8 1) The corporation would have the same 1) Organizational aspects of the c
existence as any business corporation un- tion are governed by the busim
1) Corp. 5 1 der Florida law. § 5, 13. poration laws. 55 5, 13.
2) Failure to remove a disqualified officer,2) All 5 3 shareholder, agent, or employee is a
ground for forfeiture of the Articles.
510.
GA. 7  1) Unless the Articles provide otherwise the 1) The association is governed by
association continues until dissolved by a duly elected by the members
1) Ass'n § 3 / vote of the members or expiration of officers elected by the Board
the stated term. No member has the centralization of management
2) All 5 3 power to dissolve. 5 9. assured." § 8.
2) The organization is a separate entity 2) No member has power to bi
apart from its members, and neither association within the scope
death, insanity, incompetency, conviction business or profession solely by
for a felony, resignation, withdrawal, of his being a member. 5 8.
transfer of membership, retirement, nor 3) Officers have the power to emplc
expulsion of a member affects the busi- agents "as they may deem adi
ness life. § 9. provided they are licensed if tt
3) Failure to remove an unlicensed or dis- to render professional service. 5
qualified employee is a ground for dis-
solution by the Attorney General. § 11.
All Connecticut section numbers in this panel refer to the Medical Group Clinic
Corp. Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-180 (Supp. 1959), or to the Non-Stock Corp. Act,
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 33-419 to -520 (1961).
e All Florida section numbers refer to the Professional Serv. Corp. Act, Fla. Stat. Ann.
55621.01 -.14 (Supp. 1961).
'All Georgia section numbers refer to the Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann.
55 84-4301 to -4318 (Supp. 1961).
SFERABILITY OF INTERESTS LIMITED LIABILITY
licensed persons may be employees 1) Under the Non-Stock Corporation Act
:mbers of the corporation. § 33- members are under no obligation to the
-181. corporation or its creditors other than the
!ss otherwise provided in the cer- obligation to pay fines, dues, etc. 5 33-
e of incorporation a member may 472 (a).
oluntarily or involuntarily transfer
iembership or any rights arising
rom." Non-Stock Corp. Act 5 33-
I).
:ransfer must be made to a licensed 1) Nothing in the act changes in any way
tioner. 55 3 (2), 9, 11. the "professional relationship and liabili-
ansfer may be made by any share- ties between the person furnishing the
7 unless a majority of the remain- professional services and the person re-
hares are voted in favor of the ceiving such professional service.
er. The action must be taken at a § 7.
iolders' meeting called specially for 2) Any officer, shareholder, agent, or em-
)urpose. § 11. ployee remains personally liable for neg-
krricles may provide additional re- ligence or misconduct he committed or
ts on transferability. 5 11. someone "under his direct supervision
and control" committed in rendering the
service. § 7.
:ransfer must be made to a licensed
tioner. § 10, 14.
tock or membership is freely trans-
e unless the Articles otherwise pro-
5 10.
1) The Act does not change any law appli-
cable to the professional relationship, in-
cluding the liability arising therefrom.
5 7.
2) Members or shareholders are not indi-
vidually liable for debts of or claims
against the association "unless such mem-
ber . . . has personally participated in
the transaction." § 7.
STATE CENTRALIZATION 0]
1) TYPE CONTINUITY OF LIFE MANAGEMENT
2) OPEN TO
ILL.8  1) The Articles may provide that the asso- 1) The association is governed b!
ciation will continue as a separate entity elected by the members and I
I) Ass'n 5 101 independent of its members for the per- elected by the Board. § 108.
iod of time provided in the Articles or 2) No member has the power to
2) All 5 101 until dissolved by a vote of V3 of the association merely by virtue c
members. § 107. ing a member. § 108.
2) Death, insanity, incompetency, convic- 3) Members may adopt by-law
tion of felony, resignation, withdrawal, Articles may give this powe
transfer of membership, retirement or Board. 5 108.
expulsion of any one execpt the last
member, admission of new members, or 4) The officers may employ such
any like event which would dissolve a they deem advisable. § 108.
partnership, shall not affect the life of
the association. § 107.
3) The Articles may provide that no mem-
ber shall have the power to dissolve by
his act. § 107.
MINN.? 1) The corporation may organize under the 1) Management is the same as tl
BCA or under the Non-Profit Corpora- the BCA or under the Non-P.
1) Corp. 5 tion Act and enjoy the same rights and poration Act. §§ 319.03, .05.
319.02 privileges as other corporations under
those acts. § 319.05.
2) Physicians 2) The State Board has rigid control over
319.02(2) the corporation and may deny a certifi-
cate of registration on the annual appli-
cation for a) failure to remove any un-
licensed employee or director, b) lack of
surviving licensed members, or c) failure
of the corporation to comply with State
Board regulations. §§ 319.07 -. 12.
OHIO"0 1) "Chapter 1701 of the Revised Code 1) Organization is governed by
(General Corporation Law) shall be eral Corporation Law. 5 1785
1) Ass'n n  applicable to professional associations, in-
5 1785.02 eluding their organization and the man-
ner of filing articles of incorporation."
2) All § 1785.08.
§ 1785.02
'All Illinois section numbers refer to Smith-Hurd Ill. Sess. Laws, 1961, ch. 106 Y2,
55 101-09, at 432-33.
'All Minnesota section numbers refer to the Minn. Professional Corp. Act, Minn. Stat.
Ann. §§ 319.01 -. 23 (Supp 1961).
"All Ohio section numbers refer to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1785.01 -. 08 (Page,
Supp. 1961).
" From the wording of the Ohio statute it is difficult to tell what type organization
is intended. The act refers in most places to an "association," but calls for "incorporation"
and control under the general corporation laws.
SFERABILITY OF INTERESTS
es or units of ownership in a pro-
sal association shall be transferable
rsons licensed to perform the same
of professional service as that for
the professional association was
d." § 109.
LIMITED LIABILITY
1) "This act does not alter any law appli-
cable to the relationship between a per-
son furnishing professional service and a
person receiving such professional service
including liability arising out of such
professional service." § 106.
licensed, natural persons may be 1) The Act does not alter any law appli-
solders. No unlicensed person may cable to the professional relationship, in-
my shares. § 319.18. cluding liability arising out of such serv-
e corporation is formed under the ice. § 319.16.
Profit Corporation Act, then the
les must allow the members or
solders to voluntarily or involun-
transfer their shares. Otherwise no
er is valid. Non-Profit Corporation
317.25, Subd. 6(2).
can only be issued to or subse- 1) The Act does not modify any law appli-
ly transferred to licensed practi-
s. §§ 1785.05, .07.
cable to the professional relationship,
including liability arising out of such
service. S 1785.04.
STATE CENTRALIZATION Of
1) TYPE CONTINUITY OF LIFE MANAGEMENT
2) OPEN TO
OKLA. 12  1) The BCA applies to these corporations 1) Management is likewise conti
and controls all powers, privileges, the BCA. § 805.





PENN.'4  1) The association is organized for a term 1) The associates elect a Boar
of years, or in perpetuity. "Neither manages all association affa
1) Ass'n § 3 death, bankruptcy, resignation, expul- Board elects whatever officers
sion, insanity, retirement, nor transfer or advisable. § 6.
2) All § 2(2) redemption of the interest of any asso- 2) The associates adopt by-law
ciate shall cause its dissolution." § 14. contain all of the organizati
2) The association can only be dissolved by: tails. § 7.
a) expiration of the term of existence; 3) The Board hires whatever eml
or deems necessary, establishes th
b) majority vote of associates, voting of all employees, and establi
according to proportionate shares. § amounts of excess distributionm
19. ciates. §§ 8-10.
S.D.'5  1) The private corporation laws apply to 1) Management is controlled by
these corporations and control all powers, vate corporation laws. § 3.
1) Corp. 5 2 privileges, duties, restrictions, and liabili-
ties. § 3.
2) Physicians 2) The State Board may suspend or refuse
§ 2 to renew the required certificate.1" An-
nual renewal is required. §§ 6, 10.
TENN.'7  1) The Articles must provide in substance 1) The Articles must provide in
that "the death, insanity, bankruptcy, that "the authority to ma,
1) Ass'n retirement, resignation, expulsion or affairs of the association shall5 61-105 withdrawal of any member of the asso- in a board of directors, or an
ciation shall not cause its (the associa- board or committee elected
2) All tion's) dissolution." § 61-105 (a). members of the association.
S 61-105 105 (b).
" All Oklahoma section numbers refer to the Professional Corp. Act, Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 18, § 801-19 (Supp. 1961).
" Oklahoma specifically lists which professions may incorporate. Consult S 803 for
details.
"'All Pennsylvania section numbers refer to Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§ 197-1 to -20
(Supp. 1961).
"s All South Dakota section numbers refer to the Medical Corp. Act, 4 P-H Corp.
Serv. S.D. 87-88 (1961).
" The same grounds are given as are found in the Arkansas statutes. See note 3 supra.
"All Tenneessee section numbers refer to the Tenn. UPA, Tenn. Code Ann. S 61-105
(Supp. 1961).
NSFERABILITY OF INTERESTS LIMITED LIABILITY
tres may be issued and subsequently I) The Act does not alter any law appli-
nsferred only to licensed persons. Any cable to the professional relationship,
er voluntary transfer is null and including the liability arising out of
d. § 809. such services. § 812.
'o shares may be transferred upon the
oks of the professional corporation or
ied .. . until there is presented to
I filed with the corporation a certifi-
e by the regulating board" assuring
t the proposed transferee is duly li-
sed. § 809.
y transferee must be duly licensed. 1) "All of the associates . . . are liable,
2. jointly and severally, for-
is implied that the by-laws may con- a) the torts of any agent or employee of
additional restraints on transfer- the Association committed while...
lity. S 12. acting within the ordinary course of
operation of the Association;
b) the misapplication by any associate
of any money or property of a third
person if . .. received .. . in the
ordinary course of its operation." §
17.
2) "All associates .. . are liable, jointly,
for all debts and legal obligations of the
association other than those chargeable
under clauses (a) and (b)" above. S 17.
unlicensed person can be a share- 1) The act does not alter any law appli-
der or have any part in management cable to the professional relationship, in-
control of the corporation. § 14. cluding the liability arising from any
services. § 15.
- Articles must provide in substance
t the "shares or units of ownership in
association shall be transferable to
lified nonmembers of the association
:r first being offered at their fair
ae to other members of the associa-
k and not accepted." § 61-105(d).
1) The Articles must provide in substance
that "the members of the association
shall not be personally liable for debts
of, or claims against the association." 5
61-105 (c).
STATE
1) TYPE CONTINUITY OF LIFE CENTRALIZATION OF
2) OPEN TO MANAGEMENT
TEXAS"' 1) The Texas provision reads as follows: 1) There is no statutory provision
"(3) An association is not a partnership that previously cited.
I) Ass'n under this act if:
5 6(3) a) the word 'association' or 'associates'
is part of and always used in the
2) All name under which it transacts busi-
56(3) (c) ness, and
b) its assumed name certificates... con-
tain a statement substantially as fol-
lows: 'This association intends not to
be governed by the Texas Uniform
Partnership Act,' and
c) the business it transacts is wholly or
partly engaging in an activity in
which corporations cannot lawfully
engage." S 6(3).
1) The corporation is generally governed
by, and has all the rights and liabilities
under, the business corporation laws. 5
180.99(3).
2) The corporation will have perpetual ex-
istence except that the franchise may be
suspended or forfeited for failure to re-
move a disqualified shareholder, officer,
director, or employee. 5§ 180.99(6),
.99(10) (a).
1) Management will be the same as






"All Texas section numbers refer to the Texas UPA § 6(3), Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 6132b (1962).
" All Wisconsin section numbers refer to the Service Corp. Law, Wisc. Stat. Ann. §
180.99(I)-(11) (Supp. 1961).
ISFERABILITY OF INTERESTS
e is no statutory provision except
previously cited.
shareholders, directors, and officers
be licensed. § 180.99(6).
inlicensed person can have any part
anagement or control of the corpo-
n. § 180.99(6).
I) There is no statutory provision except
that previously cited.
1) The Act does not alter "any contract,
tort or other legal relationship between
a person receiving professional services
and ...persons who are licensed . . . to
render such services and who are share-
holders . . .; and any legal liability
which may arise out of such service
shall be joint and several among the
shareholders." § 180.99(8).
2) "No shareholder, director, officer, or
employee of a service corporation shall
be personally liable for the debts or




an individual partner to cause a "dissolution," even the UPA recog-
nizes that "dissolution" is a technical concept, and that it has little
actual effect on the "continuity of life" of the organization.' Simi-
larly, the Kintner and Gait cases seem impliedly to acknowledge that
an association may by contract be endowed with continuous life,
even though that association is considered a partnership under state
law." Therefore, by requiring that a member of an association must
not be able to cause its "dissolution" under state law--even though
a "dissolution" has very little effect on the actual life of the organi-
zation-the Regulations ignore the de facto and de jure continuation
of that organization."
Apparently the Treasury has taken a position which is inconsistent
with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 with respect to the duration
of the life of a partnership. Under section 708 (b) and corres-
ponding Regulations,"2 if a partnership continues to transact busi-
ness after "dissolution," it continues to be a partnership." Thus, it
seems that for purposes of determining "continuity of life," the
Treasury considers a "dissolution" to be controlling; whereas, for
purposes of determining the existence of a partnership for all other
tax purposes, a "dissolution" is a mere technicality.
Under the Kintner Regs, "continuity of life" does not seem to
be a prerequisite to taxation as a corporation. In Example 6 of the
Regulations, the organization in question obviously has no "con-
tinuity of life," yet it is classified as an association because of the
presence of the other three characteristics. 4
b. Comments on the Nev Statutes.-As the Chart illustrates, most
states did not question the Treasury's interpretation of the UPA
the agreement can provide against such, however. See Bromberg, Source and Comments,
Texas UPA § 32, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132b (1962). But even if an agree-
ment cannot block the dissolution, the same section (41) impliedly allows the business
to continue. See Bromberg, supra; UPA § 41(1).
49 See Bromberg, supra note 48, at §§ 1, 32.
"o See the authorities and explanation given in note 46 supra.
51 Granted, a corporation does not have a technical "dissolution" on the death of a
shareholder. However, the point involved is that even under the UPA a properly drawn
agreement can practically nullify any effects on the life of the organization. It seems that
the Commissioner is following a strict aggregate view of a partnership. He is identifying
the very existence of the group with the continued participation of the current partners.
A loss of a partner, e.g., by death, retirement, or lunacy, destroys that particular group
and thereby purportedly wipes out the partnership. The better view seems to be that
under the UPA the emphasis is more on an entity concept. See Bromberg, supra note 48,
at I 1; Bromberg, supra note 2, at 388 n.8.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(ii) (1956).
"a Provided that there was not a sale or exchange of 50 per cent of the total interest
in partnership capital and profits within a period of 12 consecutive months. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.708-1(b) (1) (ii) (1956).
'" Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (Example 6) (1960). However, a non-professional
group was involved in the example.
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but acquiesced therein by making express provisions for continuous
life in their organizations. Where statutes specify that the death,
retirement, lunacy, bankruptcy, or expulsion of a member or share-
holder will not cause a "dissolution,"" or where the business corpora-
tion laws of a state are permitted to govern, " there should be little
question as to the power of a professional organization to continue
despite a change in membership. In these instances the life of the
organization clearly is not coextensive with the lives of the indi-
vidual members or shareholders. Thus, there appears to be no way
for an individual member or shareholder to destroy the "identity"
of the organization as a partner may do in a partnership."
The statutes in Connecticut,"s Tennessee, and Texas do not ex-
pressly endow the professional associations with continuous life.
Rather, the Connecticut and Tennessee statutes require only that
the articles incorporate this feature, and the Texas statute does
nothing more than exclude any potential professional association
from the jurisdiction of the UPA." It is questionable whether these
provisions are sufficient to establish the "continuity" characteristic
since they merely relegate an association to common law precedents
in order to ascertain if an association possesses such an attribute.
Admittedly, there is authority implying that a professional associa-
tion at common law has continuous life; s however, in any small
professional association, the loss of even one practitioner will nor-
mally result in a realignment of the remaining members and, con-
sequently, of their legal relationships. In effect, it appears that there
is a change in the "identity" of the association similar to the change
which occurs in the "identity" of a partnership on the death, re-
tirement, or bankruptcy of a partner. Therefore, without statutory
authorization for a professional organization to continue unaffected
by the loss of a member, there may be some question as whether the
"continuity" criteria, as interpreted by the Regulations, is satisfied.
It should be noted that even without more specific statutory pro-
visions, the Connecticut, Tennessee, and Texas associitions may
55 E.g., Alabama. See supra the Chart.
5' E.g., Arkansas. See supra the Chart.
5 Since by the express statutory language there is (1) no mutual agency and (2) no
"dissolution" on the death, insanity, bankruptcy, or retirement of a member, the re-
quirements of the Treasury Regulations seem to be satisfied-i.e., that there be a "con-
tinuing identity."
" The "professional association" statute. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 34-82 (Rev. of 1958,
rev. to 1962).
s See supra the Chart for a summary of these states' provisions.
" It seems to be the prevailing view that a common law association can have continuous
life. Tyrrell v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 500, 501 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 747




compare favorably with the medical clinic approved for corporate
taxation in the first example in the Regulations"-assuming, of
course, that the articles provide for continuous life.
Another problem may arise if the Treasury should require the
professional corporations to prove that they are corporations under
the tax laws. 2 The problem is whether a statutory requirement that
a professional corporation procure an annual certificate will destroy
the characteristic of "continuity of life."'" Since the existence of the
corporation is not directly tied to the continued participation of a
particular shareholder, in one sense there is "continuity." However,
the corporation can lose its right to function in certain states if for
some reason, e.g., disqualification of a shareholder to practice, the
certificate cannot be renewed. In this respect the life of the pro-
fessional corporation is coextensive with the continuing participa-
tion in the corporation of an individual shareholder."'
2. Centralization of Management
(1) An organization has centralized management if any person (or
any group of persons which does not include all the members) has
continuing exclusive authority to make the management decisions
necessary to the conduct of the business for which the organization
was formed ....
(2) ....
(3) Centralized management means a concentration of continuing
exclusive authority to make independent business decisions on behalf
of the organization which do not require ratification by members of
such organization ...
(4) There is no centralization of continuing exclusive authority to
make management decisions, unless the managers have sole authority
6"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (Example 1) (1960).
6"A Florida CPA concludes that the Commissioner will not question an organization
whenever it has been incorporated and registered with the Secretary of State on the
theory that the Regulations were intended to deal with the more nebulous organizations
which were neither a corporation nor a partnership. Eber, The Pros ly Cons of the New
Professional Service Corporations, 15 J. Taxation 308 (1961). An attorney in the October
1961 issue of the same magazine likewise felt that the Internal Revenue Service would
treat these "corporations" at face value. Maier, Don't Confuse Kintner-type Associations
with New Professional Corporations, 15 J. Taxation 248 (1961). However, see Bittker,
Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments,
17 Tax. L. Rev. 1 (1962), and Comment, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 784-85 (1962) for
contrary views. It does seem doubtful that the Commissioner will permit himself to be so
bound by state law that he cannot look behind the label "corporation" to see if the
organization is in law a corporation.
68Arkansas, Connecticut (group medical clinic), Minnesota, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota require certificates. See sources cited notes 3, 5, 9, 12, and 16 supra the Chart,
and the accompanying text.
64The Oklahoma statute goes further than just specifying an annual certificate. It
requires the corporation to secure from the State Board a certificate which approves each
prospective shareholder or member. No penalties are provided for a failure to do so,
however. See Professional Corp. Act, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 809 (Supp. 1961).
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to make such decisions. . . . [B]ecause of the mutual agency relation-
ship ...a general partnership cannot achieve effective concentration
of management powers, and therefore, centralized management ....
a. Comments on the "Centralization" Requirement.-The inter-
pretation given this characteristic is particularly restrictive upon
states which have enacted the UPA, because under that act all
partners have equal rights in the management of the business, 6
though they may waive these rights by an agreement. However, even
if there is a contract under which certain partners are to act as
sole managers," as to third persons without notice every partner
remains an agent of the partnership." Therefore, the "centraliza-
tion" required by the Regulations is nearly impossible to obtain
wherever the UPA is in force.
One noteworthy provision of the Regulations is that persons
managing the professional association or professional corporation
need not be members or shareholders of that organization."' Several
states have incorporated such a feature into their acts-albeit at
the risk of incurring objections on ethical grounds.7
In all of the examples in the Regulations in which organizations
are classified as associations, "centralization of management" is
present.' Undoubtedly this is an essential characteristic, since it is
indeed difficult to imagine an entity similar in form to a corporation
which does not have such a feature.
b. Comments on the New Statutes.-Most states adequately endow
their professional organizations with the feature of "centralized
management."72 All of the "corporation" states, and Alabama,
Georgia, and Ohio of the "association" states," permit the profes-
sional corporation or professional association to utilize the organiza-
tional structure of the local business corporations. This approach
seems to satisfy the Treasury's requirement that there be an exclusive
governing body with sole authority to manage.
The approaches taken by the other "association" states are some-
what less satisfactory because the statutes merely call for "cen-
tralized management" and do not specify precisely how this is to
"
5Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1960).
e
6 UPA § 18(e).
'TSee Texas UPA § 18(2), Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132b (1962).
e
6 UPA §§ 9(1), (4).
'Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (1960).
7o Alabama, Georgia, and Pennsylvania all seem to allow unlicensed members on their
associations' Boards of Governors. See supra the Chart. See note 167 infra and the accom-
panying text for a discussion of the ethical problem.
7' Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (Examples 1, 5, 6) (1960).
72 Contra, Bittker, supra note 62, at 13-15; Comment, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 780 (1962).
" See supra the Chart for details.
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be achieved." However, for tax purposes a "centralized manage-
ment" can probably be attained by the use of an agreement which
specifically provides for an exclusive governing body. Certainly at
common law an association has "centralized management." ' There-
fore, if both the applicable case law of a state and the professional
association statute of that state recognize the right of an association
to centralize exclusive control in a governing board, a professional
association should be able to meet the requirements in the Regulations.
Attempts to incorporate the characteristic of "centralized man-
agement" into professional associations and professional corporations
generate two problems which arise solely because of traditional con-
cepts of professional practice.
The first problem is whether there can in fact be a sole vesting of
authority in a central board in light of the notion that each practi-
tioner has a personal right to advise, serve, and make binding agree-
ments with his client or patient." The argument is made that if it
is true that each practitioner can control the course of his relation-
ship with a particular client, then it follows that a governing board
does not have exclusive management authority.
This argument is questionable, because as a practical matter it is
not true that each practitioner has plenary power to make binding
contracts with a client. In many professional organizations today,
for example, there are managing partners who can and do control
the services which other practitioners extend to their respective
clients. Because governing boards in professional associations and
professional corporations are given statutory rights to manage all
aspects of those organizations, they certainly will have at least the
same control over their practitioner-employees as do managing
partners today. In addition to control over the professional aspects
of the organization, most states give the governing boards the ex-
clusive right to manage all non-professional functions such as the
hiring and firing of new employees and the setting of salaries. 8
Therefore, in contrast to a partnership, with its rights of delectus
personae, mutual agency, and joint control of all management func-
"
4 E.g., Tenn. UPA, Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-105(3)(b) (1961).
"SSee 1 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 21 (perm. ed. 1931); cf. Burk-Waggoner
Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925); Tyrrell v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 500, 501
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 747 (1937); Wholesalers Adjustment Co. v. Commissioner,
88 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1937).
7 See Bittker, supra note 62, at 13-14; Comment, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 782 (1962)
for an articulation of this idea.
" The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics recognizes this right of managing
partners to so control a firm of lawyers. See Opinion No. 303, 48 A.B.A.J. 159, 160 (1962).
"
8 E.g., the Pennsylvania act. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§ 197-8 to -10 (Supp. 1961).
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tions by all partners, the professional association can in fact possess
"centralized management" of a corporate nature.
The second problem concerns the existence of joint and several
liability among practitioners in a professional organization for the
unauthorized acts of other practitioners." Here the argument is made
that there can be no effective "centralization of management" if one
practitioner can subject all other practitioners in a firm or clinic to
liability for his acts. In other words, it is asserted that each prac-
titioner can effectively bind the entire firm by obligating every other
practitioner and that under such circumstances the governing board
does not have exclusive authority to make binding obligations."°
It does not follow from this argument that the presence of joint
and several liability will nullify the corporate characteristic of
"centralized management." Under the Regulations "centralized man-
agement" exists when (1) the board has continuing exclusive au-
thority to make independent decisions and (2) these decisions do not
require ratification by any other member."s Because in some states
a governing board is given the exclusive power to make all manage-
ment decisions, " and because the feature of joint and several liability
is by no means an affirmative right which empowers a practitioner
to make management decisions, it is difficult to see just how joint
and several liability detracts from a board's "exclusive" power to
manage. The liability which results from a joint and several feature
in no way impinges upon the authority of a board to manage. A
governing board can certainly enforce its right to exclusive manage-
ment by requiring indemnification from the errant practitioner for
any of his acts which result in joint liability. As for the second
element in the Regulations-i.e., that decisions of the Board must
not require ratification by any other member-joint and several
liability clearly is not a form of ratification by other members.
The Regulations supply the second reason that "centralized man-
agement" can coexist in the same organization with the feature of
joint and several liability. In the first example of the Regulations,
the governing board of a medical association is given exclusive mana-
gerial powers, and despite the fact that the members of the association
remain jointly and severally liable for each other's acts, the association
is considered to have "centralized management.""
"'See Wilson, supra note 21, at 13, 18.
80 1d. at 13.
81Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3) (1960).82 E.g., Georgia. See Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. 5 84-4308 (Supp. 1961).




(1) An organization has the corporate characteristic of limited
liability if under local law there is no member who is personally liable
for the debts of or claims against the organization. Personal liability
means that a creditor of an organization may seek personal satisfaction
from a member of the organization to the extent that the assets of such
organization are insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim. . .. "
a. Comments on the "Limited Liability" Requirement.-The cri-
terion of "limited liability" is unattainable for a common law as-
sociation which is classified as a partnership in a state which has
enacted the UPA, since under that act partners are jointly and
severally liable for certain claims against the partnership."5 Even
more significant is the fact that "limited liability" is the one feature
which distinguishes a common law association from a corporation,
since an association has joint and several liability among its members."
It should be noted that this characteristic is not an essential fea-
ture of a corporation under the case law and under the Regulations.
Both the court in the Kintner case" and the Commissioner in the
first and fifth examples" recognize that organizations may be taxed
as corporations without possessing any form of "limited liability."
b. Comments on the New Statutes.-The requirement of "limited
liability" has fostered a variety of responses from the states. How-
ever, in spite of this variety, very few, if any, of the statutes fulfill
the requirements specified in the Regulations.
Several states have adopted a rather stock phrase which limits per-
sonal liability to the practitioner directly involved in a transaction
with a client or patient." The difficulty with this phrase is the lack of
clarity of the terms "personally participate" and "render." In all
probability these statutes retain personal liability for a practitioner
for the acts of his agents and servants, for surely acts committed by
an agent or servant constitute a form of direct participation by the
principal. Thus, even in the five states where the business corpora-
84Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1960).
'"See UPA §5 13-15.
"Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 111 (1925).
87216 F.2d at 424. See Tyrrell v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 500, 501 (5th Cir.), cerf.
denied, 302 U.S. 747 (1937); cf. Wilson, supra note 21, at 13.
88 Treas. Reg. 5 301.7701-2(g) (Examples 1, 5) (1960).
"8 The phrase purpo-'ts not to change in any way the ". . . professional relationship and
liabilities between the person furnishing the professional services and the person receiving
such professional service .. " Professional Service Corp. Act § 7, Fla. Stat. Ann. S
621.07 (Supp. 1961). Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota have almost identical provisions. See supra the Chart for the statutes. So far the
interpretations of the stock phrase have not been wholly in agreement. See Bittker, supra
note 62, at 9, 10; Comment, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 780-81 (1962) (a "broad," a
"narrow," and an "intermediate reading, albeit a strained one.").
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tion laws govern in conjunction with the stock phrase'--and no
personal liability exists on the part of shareholders not directly in-
volved in a transaction with a client 9-it is impossible to satisfy
the Treasury requirement that no member of the organization be
vicariously liable for claims against the organization. Therefore,
there is no "limited liability" of a corporate nature.
The status of members of associations in several of the "associa-
tion" states is subject to considerable doubt. These states have
ambiguous provisions which state that "the Act does not modify any
law applicable to the professional relationship including liability
arising out of such service."'" It seems doubtful that this clause will
in any way change the common law rule of joint and several liability
among members of an association. The clause certainly does not
change the practitioner's personal liability to his client for his acts
or for those of his agents; therefore, for tax purposes, the criteria
of "limited liability" remains unattainable for associations in those
states.
The other states fail to satisfy the "limited liability" requirement
for one of two reasons. When there is no provision concerning "limit-
ed liability" in an "association" state, the common law will prevail
and there will be no limitation on the member's personal liabilities.
Finally, some states expressly call for some form of joint and several
liability."
4. Free Transferability of Interests
(1) An organization has the corporate characteristic of free trans-
ferability of interests if each of its members or those members owning
substantially all of the interests in the organization have the power,
without the consent of other members, to substitute for themselves in
" Arkansas, Florida, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota have such provisions.
See supra the Chart.
1 Clearly the business corporation laws will preclude shareholder liability unless, of
course, the shareholder himself commits negligence or some other tort. However, the Ohio
statute in particular does not seem to apply the business corporation laws to the liability
aspects of the association. On the face of the statute the business corporation laws apply
only to "organization and the manner of filing articles of incorporation." Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 1785.08 (Page, Supp. 1961).
2 Taken from the Ohio act. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.04 (Page, Supp. 1961).
" See Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-17 (Supp. 1961); Service Corp. Law, Wisc. Star.
Ann. § 180.99(8) (Supp. 1961). The Connecticut (association) statute is particularly
difficult to understand. The act straightforwardly grants "limited liability so that individual
members of the association shall not be individually or severally liable for its debts .. "
However, the same sentence then rules out any limitation on "individual or several liability
in the Articles of Association or otherwise, for any acts of reckless or wanton conduct,
negligence, malpractice, professional misconduct or tort." Evidently there is several liability
in any situation where the association incurs liability because of some tortious act, but




the same organization a person who is not a member of the organiza-
tion. In order for this power of substitution to exist in the corporate
sense, the member must be able, without the consent of other members
to confer upon his substitute all the attributes of his interest in the
organization .... '
a. Comments on the "Free Transferability" Requirement.-Clearly
these requirements cannot be met by any organization which is
treated as a partnership in a jurisdiction governed by the UPA. The
reason is that assignments of interests in an organization governed by
the UPA transfer only proprietary and not managerial rights."
Moreover, under that Act the resignation of one of the partners
from the partnership will cause a "dissolution" unless otherwise
agreed."
The Regulations accept as a corporate characteristic a "free trans-
ferability" which is weakened to the extent of a right of "first
refusal." Under this method, shares of stock may be freely trans-
ferred after the governing board has first been given an opportunity
to purchase the shares at fair market value." However, even if the
requirement of "free transferability" is completely abrogated, the
Treasury has indicated that an organization may still obtain cor-
porate tax treatment if it has satisfied the other three requirements."
b. Comments on the New Statutes.-All of the new laws, with the
exception of the Texas statute, permit the transfer of interests in a
professional corporation or professional association only to licensed
members of the profession." However, this type of limitation ap-
pears to have been discounted by the Commissioner, because the
association in Example 1 of the Regulations contains a similar restric-
tion, yet "free transferability" is stated to be a positive corporate
characteristic of the organization.9 In addition to this limitation
on the transfer of shares, most states adopt the first refusal modifi-
cation. Thus, under many statutes a transferor will have to offer
any shares he is selling to the governing board, and if rejected by
the board, then limit his prospective buyers to licensed persons.
The new statutes do not clearly state whether prospective pur-
"4Treas. Reg. S 301.7701-2 (e) (1960).
"UPA § 27.
"See UPA § 29, 41(1).
'"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (1960).
"'Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (Examples 1, 4, 5, 6) (1960). Examples 1, 5, and 6
were approved for corporate taxation. For Treasury approval of an organization without
capital stock, or any form of transferable memberships, see Letter from John S. Littleton,
Director, Tax Rulings Div., Comm'r of Int. Rev., to Reid & Riege, P-H Pens. & Prof.
Sh. Rep. 5 11979 (1961).
"' See supra the Chart.
'" Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (Example 1) (1960).
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chasers of membership interests must be currently engaged in active
professional practice in order to acquire the interests. It is equally
uncertain whether retiring practitioners are to be permitted to hold
their interests. If the potential buyers are limited to those in active
practice, or if retiring members cannot retain their interests or
acquire other shares or certificates, then there is an even more sub-
stantial limitation placed on "free transferability. 1. 1 When this ad-
ditional restriction is added to the first refusal modification and the
narrowing of the class of purchasers to licensed persons, it is evident
that "free transferability" has become a "qualified transferability";
and as such, it seems doubtful that the characteristic is truly "cor-
porate" in nature.
Without the limitation of sales to active practitioners, the trans-
ferability of interests in a professional organization appears to be
more corporate in nature than non-corporate. In spite of all other
limitations, a transferor can select his transferee from among licensed
members of his profession, and he can transfer all vestiges of his
interest to the person of his choice, unless the board chooses to buy
his shares. Therefore, since the Treasury's only emphasis seems to be
on assuring a form of transferability through which a shareholder
may sell his interests without securing the consent of any other
person,"' most of the new organizations do seem to be more cor-
porate in nature in this respect.
Several states permit additional restrictions on transferability."'
However, these further impediments will, in all probability, eliminate
any chance of meeting the requirements of the Regulations.
Because of the exclusionary nature of the Texas provision, the
articles will control the transfer of membership interests. Since the
common law governs the professional association, there appear to be
no restrictions on "free transferability 1 . except the limitations in-
herent in any professional organization, viz., transfers to licensed
persons only.
5. Is Corporate Taxation Possible Under the Regulations?
Whether professional associations and professional corporations can
qualify for corporate tax treatment is presently a matter of great
debate. Because of the variety of legal factors which come into play
under the different state statutes and under the particular articles to
be considered, each organization will have to be treated separately by
'0' For an opinion that this feature deals a fatal blow to the transferability require-
ment, see Bittker, supra note 62, at 17.
.. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1960).
103 Namely, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Pennsylvania. See supra the Chart.
104 See I Fletcher, supra note 75; McKay, supra note 45, at 436.
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the Internal Revenue Service. Consequently, conclusions which are
general in nature are difficult to make. However, based upon the
considerations previously discussed, it appears that organizations in
a few states can possibly satisfy the tax requirements. In summary,
the criteria and the reasons why each may or may not be satisfied by
the state statutes may be stated as follows:
(1) There can be "continuity of life" in organizations in states
where the enabling legislation explicitly confers this attribute upon
the professional association or the professional corporation. Under
these particular statutes, a professional organization possesses a "con-
tinuing identity which is detached from the relationship between its
stockholders."'0 5
(2) There can be "centralized management" under the statutes
which grant exclusive managerial authority to a central board. The
reason is that there is nothing inherent in the nature of professional
practice to prevent such explicitly conferred "centralization."
(3) There can be at least a modified form of "free transferability
of interests" which is more corporate than non-corporate in nature.
The restrictions which the states usually place on the "free transfer-
ability" are: (a) a limitation upon transfers to licensed persons only;
and (b) the first refusal technique, which permits the organization
to have some control over its membership. While these limitations do
severely narrow the group to whom transfers may be made, it is sig-
nificant that there is usually no requirement that the consent of other
members be obtained before any proposed transfer is made. Con-
sequently, for the most part, the Regulations are satisfied.(4) There cannot be a limitation on the personal liability of pro-
fessional shareholders which is more corporate than non-corporate in
nature. This conclusion is based upon the premise that in retaining
all of the traditional liabilities which attend the professional relation-
ship, the new statutes render the practitioner personally liable for his
own acts as well as those of his agents and servants.
C. Associations Or Corporations?
In spite of the eagerness exhibited by the states to gain preferential
tax treatment for professional groups, some have labeled their pro-
genies "professional associations" without any ostensible reason for
shunning the "corporation" name tag. However, in doing so, these
states have blurred to some extent the already hazy distinction be-
tween an ordinary association and an ordinary corporation. Of course,
this blurring has not confused the states' administrative authori-
... These are the words used in the Treasury Regulations at § 301.7701-2(b) (2) (1960).
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ties, for at least Minnesota and Connecticut have ruled that their
"tassociations" must pay state corporation taxes."'
To illustrate the extent to which these distinctions have been
blurred, consider the Georgia "professional association.' '.. The major
difference between an association and a corporation is that an associa-
tion has the feature of joint and several liability among its members."8
However, under the Georgia statute there is a positive declaration
that members of the association are "not ... individually liable for
the debts of, or claims against, the . . association unless such mem-
ber . . . has personally participated."'' . Moreover, instead of the
ordinary membership certificates, the Georgia "association" may
issue stock"' which is "freely transferable" to licensed practition-
ers."' In addition, the "association" has a highly centralized manage-
ment,"' and individual members are denied the power to obligate or
dissolve the "association."'' . Other characteristics which are corporate
in nature include the power to contract, hold real property, sue and
be sued, and make investments in its own name."4 As a rather con-
clusive reminder that the "professional association" is not a true
association, the Georgia statute invokes the general corporation
laws to cover all matters not touched upon in the special "professional
association" statute."' The only traditional distinction between a
corporation and an association which Georgia retains is that of formal
and informal formation and dissolution. For unlike an ordinary cor-
poration, the "professional association" need not be incorporated by
filing with the Secretary of State nor dissolved by a court order;
rather, the articles are simply filed with the clerk of the local superior
court.. and withdrawn in the same manner after a two-thirds vote
favoring dissolution."7
In a somewhat converse position is the professional service cor-
poration of Wisconsin. That "corporation" retains the association
feature of joint and several liability for tort claims against the
". The Connecticut ruling was reported in 1 P-H Corp. Serv. 13.9 (1961). The
Ohio ruling was handed down in Tax Bull. No. 161, Tax Commissioner 8-15-61, and
reported in 1 P-H Corp. Serv. 12.9 (1961). Note that the recent Virginia act provides
that the professional association shall be taxed in Virginia as a corporation. Professional
Ass'n Act § 25, 4 P-H Corp. Serv. Va. 374 (1962).
"0' Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4301 to -4315 (Supp. 1961).
''Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 111 (1925).
' Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4307 (Supp. 1961).
"' Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4310 (Supp. 1961).
"'. Ibid.
"'. Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4308 (Supp. 1961).
"1 Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4309 (Supp. 1961).
"1 Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. 55 84-4305, -4316 (Supp. 1961).
"'. Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. 5 84-4318 (Supp. 1961).
"6 Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4304 (Supp. 1961).
" Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. 5 84-4309 (Supp. 1961).
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organization."' However, for all other purposes the organization is
more in the nature of a corporation because it is governed by the
business corporation laws."'
Undoubtedly the states have avoided the designation "corporation"
in order to by-pass possible ethical objections to corporate practice
of a profession. While this avoidance may have been wise for pur-
poses of dodging local ethical problems, the states which have attached
"corporation" to their professional organizations have procured a
salutary tax consequence. Early in 1961 the Treasury ruled that it
would accept a professional corporation prima facie as a tax corpo-
ration for the purpose of ruling on that organization's qualified
pension plan.'20 In contrast, however, the professional associations
must first prove their right to be taxed as a corporation and then
attempt to qualify their pension plans.
D. The "rEmployee' 2 Requirement
Since a motivating factor in the passage of the recent statutes was
the desire to obtain more favorable pension and profit sharing oppor-
tunities, it is essential that an employer-employee relationship exist
between the professional organization and all practitioners who de-
sire to participate in such plans."' Rulings of the Internal Revenue
Service indicate that a professional person will be classified as an
employee of a corporation only if he is an employee "for all pur-
poses .... ,, which means he must be substantially under the control
.. Service Corp. Law, Wisc. Stat. Ann. S 180.99(8) (Supp. 1961). The Arizona
professional corporation also retains the feature of joint and several liability, although
it is not altogether clear to what claims such liability applies. Section 10-905 of the
Arizona Professional Corporation Act states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to alter any law applicable to
the relationship between persons furnishing and receiving professional service,
including but not limited to liability arising therefrom, and the shareholders
of the corporation shall be and remain jointly and severally responsible for
such liability. 2 P-H Corp. Serv. Ariz. 43 (1962).
As if this were not confusing enough, the legislature in § 10-908(5) made it mandatory
that the professional corporation "provide that the private property of shareholders be
exempt from liability for corporate debts except as set forth in section 10-905." 2 P-H
Corp. Serv. Ariz. 44 (1962). Presumably the legislature meant to make the same dis-
tinction between claims on torts and claims on contracts which the Wisconsin statute
clearly makes.
"'Service Corp. Law, Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(3) (Supp. 1961).
12 Rev. Proc. 61-11, 1961 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 18, at 53; P-H Tax Ideas 5 11.2 (1961).
121 Ibid; see Speech by Isidore Goodman, Chief, Pension Trust Branch of the Internal
Revenue Service, at a Conference Sponsored by the Graduate School of Business, New
York University, Current Tax Problems in the Pension Trust Field, in P-H Pens. & Prof.
Sh. Rep. 5 1089.4 (1962).
12 Rev. Rul. 57-163, Part 2(i) (3), 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 128, 134. This ruling modified
an earlier ruling which had emphasized the necessity of control over the potential em-
ployee. P.S. No. 15 (1944); P-H Pens. & Prof. Sh. Rep. 5 12513 (1961). However, the
current Treasury Regulations still require a relatively large amount of control. Regulation
S 31.3401(c)-l(b) (1957) reads:
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of the governing body and classified as an employee for such things
as the Social Security program. Under "association" statutes like that
of Pennsylvania, which gives the board of governors express powers
to hire and discharge employees,"'3 to set all salaries,'2 to make all
management decisions, 2 and to establish all distributions from prof-
its," the requirements of the Revenue Rulings are easily met.
1 7
However, under the statutes of Connecticut, Tennessee, and Texas," 8
the employer-employee relationship will have to be firmly estab-
lished in the articles or by individual contracts since the statutes
themselves supply few guideposts for determining legal relation-
ships within the associations."0
(b) Generally the relationship of employer and employee exists when the
person for whom services are performed has the right to control and direct
the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be
accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that
result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control
of the employer not only as to what shall be done but how it shall be done.
In this connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually direct or
control the manner in which the services are performed; it is suflicient if he
has the right to do so. The right to discharge is also an important factor
indicating that the person possessing that right is an employer. Other
factors characteristic of an employer, but not necessarily present in every
case, are the furnishing of tools and the furnishing of a place to work to
the individual who performs the services. In general, if an individual is
subject to the control or direction of another merely as to the result to be
accomplished by the work and not as to the means and methods for accom-
plishing the result, he is not an employee. (Emphasis added.)
Section 31.3401 (c)-1 (c) continues:
Generally, physicians, lawyer3, dentists, veterinarians, contractors, subcon-
tractors .. . and others who follow an independent trade . . .or profession,
in which they offer their services to the public, are not employees.
The Regulations are on sound ground in stating that normally professional prac-
titioners are not considered employees. Taking physicians and surgeons (including dentists),
for example, it was long the rule that physicians were not regarded as agents of persons
hiring them since they were not under that person's control in rendering the professional
services. See Annot., 19 A.L.R. 1168, 1183 (1922). Since the Regulations appear to use
'employee" in the sense of "agent," the Regulations merely restate the common law rule.
However, some cases have recognized a physician as an "employee." See Tompkins v.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 53 W. Va. 479, 44 S.E. 439, 62 L.R.A. 489, 97 Am. St. Rep.
1006 (1903); ci. Woodburn v. Standard Forgings Corp., 112 F.2d 271, 129 A.L.R. 337
(7th Cir. 1940).
.. Professional Ass'n Act § 8, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, S 197-8 (Supp. 1961).
.24 Professional Ass'n Act § 9, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-9 (Supp. 1961).
12s Professional Ass'n Act §§ 6-7, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-6 to -7 (Supp. 1961).
' Professional Ass'n Act § 9, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-10 (Supp. 1961).
... The provisions of § 13 of the Virginia Professional Association Act are similar to the
Pennsylvania act. See 4 P-H Corp. Serv. Va. 372 (1962). See also the favorable
provisions in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. For the Alabama and Georgia
statutes see supra the Chart. For the South Carolina provisions see Professional Associa-
tion Act, 4 P-H Corp. Serv. S.C. 55-58 (1962).
... These three states add amendments to their respective Uniform Partnership Acts.
The changes seem designed only to meet the four criteria specified in the Kintner Regula-
tions. See supra the Chart.
12" Richard MacKay, the Texas attorney who drafted the articles of the Southwestern
Medical Clinic (which was the clinic involved in the Gait decision), has set out a list
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E. Other Economic Considerations
Once a professional corporation has been approved for corporate
tax treatment, aside from the benefits gained, there are certain un-
desirable tax consequences to be considered. Because several of these
problems have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere,' 30 let it suffice
here to list the possible adverse factors which any draftsman should
consider: (1) double taxation on earnings of the corporation and
dividends to the shareholders; (2) the personal holding company
tax;' (3) the accumulated earnings tax; 3 (4) state corporation
taxes for both professional associations and professional corporations;
(5) taxes on distribution of assets on dissolution; 33 (6) higher in-
corporation and certificate renewal fees; 34 (7) possible costs of liti-
gation which may be necessary to decipher some of the vague sub-
stantive law provisions in some of the statutes."'
When the effects of these taxes are calculated, it may well be that
a professional corporation is economically disadvantageous. Certainly
these additional taxes, plus the contributions to a pension and profit
sharing plan, will result in a substantial drop in a practitioner's take-
home pay (especially when contrasted with his former rights to an
immediate sharing in the profits of a partnership). Moreover, in
of suggestions for assuring that an employee status may be obtained in an association at
2 P-H Tax Ideas 5 8057.2 (1961). He includes:
1) Payment of associates entirely by salary, with no right to participate in
profits by drawing accounts.
2) No right on the part of the associates to any particular fee related to
work he has done.
3) Definite work and vacation schedules.
4) Obligation of the association to supply a place to work as well as the
equipment.
5) The right of control over the work of the associates by the association.
6) Policy and management vested in elected representatives.
7) Power in the association to hire and discharge employees.
8) A management group smaller than the number of associates.
"0 See Bittker, supra note 62, at 6 n.8 (on the personal holding company tax) ; Comment,
75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 790 (1962) (on the accumulated earnings tax, personal holding com-
pany tax, and double taxation); Stavole, Corporate Employee Tax Status for the Professional
Man, 11 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 176, 182-83 (1962) (on the accumulated earnings and personal
holding company taxes).
... Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 541-47.
'3' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 531-37.
"3' nt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 301-12.
... These fees are nominal in some states, e.g., Florida, and fairly substantial in others,
e.g., Minnesota.
.. For example, under the many statutes which purport to limit personal liability to
those practitioners who "personally participate" in rendering professional services, what
type of act does it take for a person to "participate"? If an officer of a professional
association of lawyers asks an associate to help another associate in briefing a case, has
the officer "personally participated" to the extent that he will be held responsible for any
claims from the client involved? What if a Board of Governors in a medical association
makes an informal decision to take a certain course of action in regard to a patient;
will each Board member have "personally participated" in that patient's case?
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recent years in most states the case law construing the legal rights
and liabilities of associations, their associates, and third parties, has
"atrophied.' '.. The uncertainties about potential liabilities and re-
sponsibilities caused by this lack of substantive law are additional
factors which should be carefully weighed. Thus it is possible that
a professional association or professional corporation may be less
profitable than a partnership because of the numerous taxes37 and
less attractive because of the lack of substantive law.
III. LEGISLATIVE, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL
OBJECTIONS TO PROFESSIONAL INCORPORATION
A. The Problems Encountered
Before the recent flurry of statutes, incorporation by professional
men was generally considered undesirable. Not only were there
legislative decrees".. as well as cases"' forbidding such practices, but
the professions themselves took firm positions against incorporation
by practitioners. 140 Now, of course, the situation has greatly changed;
and statutes permitting professional incorporation are in the vogue
among the various state legislatures. However, it remains to be seen
if all of the courts and the various professional societies in each
state will endorse these new statutes. 4 ' With that in mind, this
section presents for analysis the four fundamental objections which
in the past have been used to strike down attempts made by profes-
sional men to incorporate. 4' The purpose of the section is to test the
vitality of these objections in light of the recent enactments.
136 See Bromberg, supra note 2, at 389 n.ll.
137 However, see the article on page one of the May 23, 1962, edition of the Wall
Street Journal in which officers of some of the newly-formed associations and corpora-
tions attest to the money saved.
.3S E.g., Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 752 (1961) (dentistry); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 4498 (1960) (medicine); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 249(a)-7(a) (1959)
(architecture); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 320(a)-1, §3 (1959) (law).
139 See cases cited notes 143, 151, 161, and 178 infra.
'4'E.g., State Bar of Texas, Canons of Ethics, Canon 32 (1958); ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics and Judicial Ethics, Canons 34, 35 (Rev. of 1957); Texas Society of
CPAs, Roster of Members, Rules of Professional Conduct Nos. 3, 11 (1956-57). The
AMA had prior to this time opposed the corporate practice of medicine, though there
seems to be no official canon or rule prohibiting such. See AMA Digest of Official Actions
1846-1958, at 129, 130, 134, and 142 (1959).
141 Compare In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961) (approving incorporation for
lawyers) with State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962)
(rejecting incorporation for lawyers).
42 These four have been selected by the author as the most serious, rational arguments
against professional incorporation. See generally 6 Fletcher, Private Corporations 5 2524
(perm. ed. rev. repl. 1950); Lewis, Corporate Capacity to Practice Law--A Study in
Legal Hocus Pocus, 2 Md. L. Rev. 342 (1938); Willcox, Hospitals and the Corporate
Practice of Medicine, 45 Cornell L.Q. 432, 443 (1960) (three reasons); Comment, 45 Mich.
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The form used in this section is similar to that employed in the
preccding one. First, an objection is stated. Immediately following
each is a presentation of the treatment accorded to it by the various
states. Finally, there are comments upon the objection and upon its
statutory treatment. Even though these legislative, judicial, and
ethical expressions of disapproval have been applied mainly against
corporations, both the "corporation" and the "association" statutes
are classified below because of the similarities between the two.
1. Objection
Because a corporation is an artificial entity, it cannot possess the
personal, moral, and intellectual qualifications required of a pros-
pective practitioner under the licensing statutes.""
a. Treatment Under the Statutes.-In the "corporation" states
there has been no attempt made to license the corporation per se.
However, five states do require an annual certification which is some-
L. Rev. 885 (1947) (two "basic" reasons); Note, 48 Yale L.J. 346 (1939) (two
"common" objections).
An objection, not analyzed below, which is sometimes mentioned is that of a fear
of a loss of freedom by the client in selecting his practitioner. See People ex rel. State Bd. of
Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P.2d 429, 430 (1938);
Note, 48 Yale L.J. 346 (1939).
Statements to the effect that "legislative intent" forbids incorporation, or that practice
of a profession is not a "business purpose" under the general corporation laws, usually
seem to be conclusions which are based on the four objections suggested. See In re
Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15, 31 L.R.A.(n.s.) 55, 139 Am. St. Rep.
839, 19 Ann. Cas. 879 (1910). However, where the regulatory statutes provide that
only "natural" persons may practice a profession, this objection seems sound. See People
ex rel. Kerner v. United Medical Serv., 362 11. 442, 200 N.E. 157, 103 A.L.R. 1229 (1936).
.. See People ex rel. Kerner v. United Medical Serv., supra note 142 (only a natural
person can practice medicine); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 I11. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931) (emphasizing the personal aspect of the
right to practice law); State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 234 N.W. 260 (1931)
(dentistry); McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 393, 10 N.E.2d 139, 142 (1937) (optometry);
In re Cooperative Law Co., supra note 142 (law); People ex rel. Ludin v. Merchants'
Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919). But see State ex rel. Sager v. Lewin,
128 Mo. App. 149, 106 S.W. 581 (1907); State Electro-Medical Inst. v. Platner,
74 Neb. 23, 103 N.W. 1079 (1905); State Electro-Medical Inst. v. State, 74
Neb. 44, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905). These latter three cases admit that a corporation cannot
be licensed, but they deny that this is a bar to its offering professional services through
licensed agents. Supporting this position are Lewis, supra note 142; Willcox, supra note
142, at 435; Comment, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 885 (1947); Note, 48 Yale L.J. 346 (1939).
See discussion note 150 infra and accompanying text.
There is a split of authority as to whether the practice of optometry should be
considered a "learned" profession. Some states say it is not like medicine and law, and,
therefore, a corporation may offer such services through duly licensed employees. Compare
Bennett v. Indiana State Bd. of Registration and Examination in Optometry, 211 Ind.
678, 7 N.E.2d 977, 981 (1937), and State ex rel. Beck v. Goldman Jewelry Co., 142 Kan.
861, 51 P.2d 995 (1935), with Silver v. Lansburgh & Bros., 111 F.2d 518, 519, 128
A.L.R. 582 (D.D.C. 1940); Jaeckle v. Bamberger & Co., 119 N.J. Eq. 126, 181 Atl. 181
(Ch. 1935); and State ex rel. McKittrick v. Gate City Optical Co., 334 Mo. 427, 97
S.W.2d 89 (1936).
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what similar to a licensing requirement.' In addition, all of the
"corporation" states require that all shareholders, agents, and em-
ployees be licensed. 4s
None of the "association" states seek to license or even to certify
the associations. However, all states except two require that all mem-
bers (associates), agents, and employees be licensed. 4 The other
two states, Tennessee and Texas, have no relevant provisions.4 '
b. Comments.-Most states do not consider this objection an im-
portant one, and clearly it has been ignored. The prevailing view
seems to be that if all of the shareholders, agents, and employees are
licensed, then the public is adequately protected.'48 The reason for
rejecting the argument that a corporation must be licensed like any
practitioner is that an organization in and of itself poses no threat
to public safety.' It is felt that since the sole purpose of the
licensing statutes is to give protection to the public from quacks
and charlatans, this goal is achieved as long as the individual prac-
titioners in an organization are required to be licensed. Hence, fear
of harm to the public by an unlicensed corporate entity is unfounded
in the face of the new statutes.' 0
144 It should be noted that all numerical classifications in the text are based on the
1961 statutes. Provisions of the 1962 statutes are cited in the notes when those provisions
are relevant.
For support of the textual statement, see Dental Corp. Act §§ 5-7, Ark Stat. Ann. §§
64-1805 to -1807 (Supp. 1961); Medical Corp. Act. §§ 5-7, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 64-1705
to -1707 (Supp. 1961); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-181 (Rev. of 1958, rev. to 1962) (medical
group clinic corporation); Minn. Professional Corp. Act §§ 7, 8, 12, 20(1), 21, Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 319.07, .08, .12, .20(1), .21 (Supp. 1961); Professional Corp. Act § 4(c), Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 804(c) (Supp. 1961); Medical Corp. Act § 10, 4 P-H Corp. Serv.
S.D. 87 (1961). Of the 1962 enactments, the Kentucky statute requires an annual report.
See Professional Serv. Corp. Act § 11, 3 P-H Corp. Serv. Ky. 116 (1962).
.. E.g., Professional Serv. Corp. Act § 6, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621.06 (Supp. 1961).
'46E.g., Smith-Hurd I11. Sess. Laws, 1961, ch. 106'2, § 108, at 433.
147 See supra the Chart for the full text of the Texas provision; Tenn. UPA, Tenn.
Code Ann. § 61-105(3) (Supp. 1961).
14 n re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 1961).
145See Lewis, supra note 142; Comment, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 886 (1947); Note,
48 Yale L.J. 346 (1939).
.0 This idea was apparently the rationale behind the Missouri and Nebraska cases,
cited supra note 143, when they allowed a corporation to offer professional services to the
public through licensed physicians. The courts did seem to get too wrapped up in
technicalities, since they attempted to distinguish between the corporation's "practicing"
medicine and the corporation's "offering" of professional medical services by way of
contract. Actually this is a weak basis on which to decide the cases, for many other cases
involving banks and trust companies and their attempts to "offer" professional services
have reached the opposite result. E.g., Re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318, 73
A.L.R. 1319 (1930). Likewise, when insurance companies have sought to "offer" medical
services to their insured, it has been held to be an illegal "practicing" of medicine. E.g.,
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. 2d 592, 52 P.2d 992 (1935). Of
course, there is one vital distinction-in the Missouri and Nebraska cases all of the owners,
or substantially all of them, were the licensed practitioners who were offering the services.
However, neither court based its decision on this distinction.
The objection concerning the inability of a corporation to meet the literal requirements
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Clearly, the vital issues concerning the "oughts" or "ought nots"
of professional corporations do not lie in this rather superficial area
-in spite of the large number of courts which have struck down
attempts at professional incorporation on this basis. Even assuming
the existence of a reputable professional corporation having duly
licensed shareholders, agents, and employees, there are still problems
involving the legal and ethical effects a corporation will have on the
manner in which these shareholders, agents, and employees offer
professional services.
2. Objection
A corporation will destroy or seriously impair the high degree of
trust and confidence which is necessary to the professional relation-
ship, because the corporation will act as an intermediary between
the practitioner and his client."'
a. Treatment Under the Statutes.-A majority of states answer
this objection by almost identical provisions which specify that the
traditional practitioner-client relationship shall remain unchanged.'"
Aside from this provision, the statutes are silent with respect to the
professional relationship except that they do differ widely in dis-
tribution of the risk of liability which may arise from that rela-
tionship. a'
of a licensing statute would seem to have merit only insofar as the wording of a particular
statute evinced a legislative intent to exclude corporations and associations from practicing
a profession. When a state passes a professional corporation statute, this should indicate a
definite change in the legislative policy. Nevertheless, in the case of lawyers, the courts
have jealously guarded their right to control the legal profession and have ruled that
statutes which authorize professional corporations are subordinate to the desries of the court.
See In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935); State ex rel.
Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. Rep. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962).
... The reasons are: (1) the client will have his contract with the corporation, not with
the professional man; and (2) the professional man will owe a primary duty to the
corporation, not to his client. See Silver v. Lansburgh & Bros., 111 F.2d 518, 519, 128
A.L.R. 582 (D.D.C. 1940) (dictum); Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285,
14 P.2d 67 (1932); McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 393, 10 N.E.2d 139 (1937); People v.
People's Trust Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y.S. 767 (1917); United States Title
Guaranty Co. v. Brown, 86 Misc. 287, 149 N.Y.S. 186 (Sup. Ct. 1914), aff'd, 166 App.
Div. 688, 152 N.Y.S. 470 (1915), aff'd, 217 N.Y. 628, 111 N.E. 828 (1916); In re
Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); People ex rel. Lundin v. Mer-
chants' Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919); 6 Fletcher, Private Cor-
porations § 2524 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1950); see also Batty v. Arizona State Dental Bd.,
57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870 (1941) (stating that dentists are included in the phrase
"physician and surgeon" as that phrase is used in defining the duties of the physician
to his patients); cf. State Bar of Texas, Rules and Canons of Ethics, Canon 32 (1958);
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics and Judicial Ethics, Canon 3$ (Rev. of 1957); Texas
Society of CPAs, Roster of Members, Rules of Professional Conduct Nos. 3, 5 (1956-57)
But see Willcox, supra note 142, at 446 (denying any division of loyalty in the case of
non-profit corporations).
... See supra the Chart for the provisions.
'E.g., Professional Ass'n Act § 6, 2 P-H Corp. Serv. Ala. 222 (1961) (no liability
unless the person "personally participated"); Professional Corp. Act §§ 10-905, -908, 2
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b. Comments.-The recent statutes do not purport to change either
the legal or the ethical responsibilities which accompany the profes-
sional relationship. In any given situation in which a practitioner
is required to choose between protection of the corporation and pro-
tection of a client, the statutory provisions clearly imply that the
practitioner owes a higher duty to the client. Thus, this facet of the
professional relationship should be unaffected by the newly-created
entities.
Since some of the statutes limit the liability of practitioners who
do not "participate" in services to a client, or who do not themselves
"furnish" services to a client,"4 a more difficult question is whether
the shield of limited liability which is cast over these practitioners
will adversely affect the professional relationship. The answer to
this question depends upon how broadly the courts interpret the
words "participate""' and "furnish. '
If the statutory terms are given relatively broad constructions,
so that personal liability is placed upon a practitioner who renders
even a nominal amount of assistance to a client, or to the practitioner
who is handling the particular client, then the "professional respon-
sibility""" which each practitioner bears to each client or patient
can be effectively supplemented by that threat of liability. However,
if "participate" and "furnish" are narrowly construed, a practitioner
may escape liability even though he may have advised the action
taken in a particular situation. In such case, the client will have
redress only against the practitioner with whom he happened to
consult and an action against an asset-poor personal service corpora-
tion. Because of the likelihood that one individual case may receive
the attention of several different practitioners in a firm or clinic, and
because of the difficulty a client or patient may have in actually
proving who is responsible for any wrong-doing, it may be best to
impose joint and several liability on all practitioners in the profes-
P-H Corp. Serv. Ariz. 43-44 (1962) (joint and several liability among practitioners for
acts arising from the professional relationship, but no liability for corporate debts); Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 34-82 (Rev. of 1958, rev. to 1962); Professional Ass'n Act, Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 14, § 197-17 (Supp. 1961) (joint liability and several liability similar to that under
UPA § 13-15).
... E.g., Arkansas, Florida, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. See supra the
Chart under the heading "limited liability" for these provisions. Of the 1962 enactments,
Kentucky, South Carolina, and Virginia have similar provisions. See Professional Serv.
Corp. Act § 6, 3 P-H Corp. Serv. Ky. 114 (1962); Professional Ass'n Act § 7, 4 P-H
Corp. Serv. S.C. 56 (1962) ; Professional Ass'n Act § 14, 4 P-H Corp. Serv. Va. 372 (1962).
"' See, e.g., Professional Ass'n Act § 6, 2 P-H Corp. Serv. Ala. 222 (1961).
"' See, e.g., MedicAl Corp. Act § 15, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-1715 (Supp. 1961).
... This is the term used in the recent opinion of the ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics. See Opinion No. 303, 48 A.B.A.J. 159, 160 (1962).
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sional organizations."' Moreover, it should be noted that the pro-
fessional associations and professional corporations actually do not
have the need for limitations on the liability of their shareholders-
as do capital asset corporations-since there is less necessity for
protecting investors in a professional organization."' Thus, when
these factors are considered in light of the fact that practitioners
have always conducted their business under the aura of joint and
several liability in their partnerships, it may well be that courts will
refuse to permit even the form of "limited liability" offered by
certain of the statutes."'
3. Objection
There should not be a division of profits among nor exercise of
control by laymen shareholders, because laymen would then be de-
riving benefits from professional acts without sharing in the attend-
ing professional responsibilities.1"'
a. Treatment Under the Statutes.-All of the "corporation" states
require each stockholder to be duly licensed.'6 ' Four of these states
do not permit an unlicensed officer or director to serve in the cor-
15 Since it is doubtful if the prevailing form of "limited liability" is sufficiently cor-
porate in nature to satisfy the Treasury Regulations, the imposition of joint and several
liability should cause no additional adverse tax consequences.
".. The theory behind having "limited liability" in a corporation is to promote the
investment of capital by offering capital investors personal protection from the liabilities
incurred by the enterprise. See Ballantine, Corporations § 1 (1946); 1 Fletcher, Private
Corporations § 14 (perm. ed. 1931). The medical and dental professions may have bona
fide needs for capital to equip and staff their clinics and offices. Likewise, accountants and
engineers may possibly need capital for particular types of services. However, the professional
corporations are not designed to allow any real inflow of capital from outside sources
since shareholding is restricted to licensed individuals. Hence, the only "investors" who
might be protected by limited liability are other members of the profession.
1. This is not to say that there should be joint and several liability for creditors'
claims. A good example of this dichotomous type of liability is in the Wisconsin statute,
which retains joint and several liability for clients' claims, yet specifically rejects any
personal liability for "debts or other contractual obligations of the corporation." Service
Corp. Law, Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(8) (Supp. 1961). Doubtless, this type of limited
liability is insufficient for the Commissioner's purposes.
... E.g., People ex rel. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal.
2d 156, 82 P.2d 429, 430 (1938); Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285,
14 P.2d 67 (1932); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. 2d 592, 52
P.2d 992, 996 (1935); People ex rel. Kerner v. United Medical Serv., 362 Il1. 442, 200
N.E. 157, 103 A.L.R. 1229 (1936); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor
Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935); In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E.
15 (1910); cf. People v. Carroll, 274 Mich. 451, 264 N.W. 861, 863 (1936) (it is
dangerous to separate the power of control from the source of knowledge); State Bar of
Texas, Rules and Canons of Ethics, Canons 31, 32 (1958); ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics and Judicial Ethics, Canons 34, 35 (Rev. of 1957); Texas Society of CPAs, Roster
of Members, Rule of Professional Conduct No. 3 (1956-57); 6 Fletcher, op. cit. supra
note 151. But see State ex rel. Sager v. Lewin, 128 Mo. App. 149, 106 S.W. 581 (1907).
"
5 2 E.g., Medical Corp. Act § 14, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-1714 (Supp. 1961). The 1962
enactments likewise require licensed shareholders. E.g., Professional Corp. Act §5 10-907(B),
-907(C), 2 P-H Corp. Serv. Ariz. 43 (1962).
COMMENTS
poration. These same four also forbid any exercise of managerial
power by an unlicensed person."'
With the exception of Tennessee and Texas, all "association" states
require that all members and associates be licensed.' One state,
Illinois, prohibits a layman from being on the governing board."'
However, four of the "association" states have no such prohibition, 6
and the statutes of Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Alabama even permit
laymen to be on the governing board or to serve as officers.'
b. Comments.-The concern about unethical profit sharing is al-
layed by a majority of the new statutes. The enactments which re-
quire all employees, agents, stockholders, and members of the or-
ganizations to be duly licensed clearly remove most possibilities of
laymen sharing in the profits from professional acts. There is, how-
ever, one exception. With respect to employee profit sharing plans
to be set up within the organizations, the propriety of permitting
participation by the unlicensed administrative assistants is very
questionable. In the case of lawyers, in particular, the ABA Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics has recently ruled that such employee
profit sharing plans will be deemed unethical.'68 The Committee did
say, however, that other forms of deferred compensation plans were
acceptable for professional as well as non-professional employees.
In addition to the skepticism expressed about the employee profit
sharing plans, there is a serious question about the propriety of
provisions in the statutes of three "association" states which permit
unlicensed persons to serve as officers on the governing boards. There
appears to be little difference between allowing laymen to serve as
officers of professional associations and allowing banks and trust
companies, or insurance companies, to offer professional services by
'..Dental Corp. Act § 14, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-1814 (Supp. 1961); Medical Corp.
Act S 14, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-1714 (Supp. 1961); Minn. Professional Corp. Act § 18,
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 319.18 (Supp. 1961); Medical Corp. Act § 14, 4 P-H Corp. Serv.
S.D. 88 (1961); Serv. Corp. Act § 6, Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(6) (Supp. 1961). Of
the 1962 acts, Arizona and Kentucky concur. See Professional Corp. Act § 10-907(B),
-907(C), 2 P-H Corp. Serv. Ariz. 43 (1962); Professional Serv. Corp. Act § 4, 3 P-H
Corp. Serv. Ky. 113 (1962).
564E.g., Professional Ass'n Act § 5, 2 P-H Corp. Serv. Ala. 221-22 (1961). The 1962
"association" states are similar. E.g., Professional Ass'n Act § 3, 10, 4 P-H Corp. Serv.
S.C. 55, 57 (1962).
sea Smith-Hurd Ill. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 106Y2, § 108, at 433.
'66 Connecticut, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas.
567See Professional Ass'n Act § 7, 2 P-H Corp. Serv. Ala. 222 (1962); Ga. Professional
Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4308 (Supp. 1961); Professional Ass'n Act § 6, Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 14, § 197-6 (Supp. 1961). The South Carolina statute also permits unlicensed
persons on the Board. Professional Ass'n Act § 8, 4 P-H Corp. Serv. S.C. 56 (1962). The
Virginia statute requires all Board members to be licensed, but it is not clear whether § 4
of that act taken in conjunction with § 11 requires all officers to be licensed. See
Professional Ass'n Act §§ 4, 10, 11, 4 P-H Corp Serv. Va. 370-72 (1962).
ae0 Opinion 303, 48 A.B.A.J. 159, 162 (1962).
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licensed employees.' 0 In both situations laymen are ultimately sharing
in profits of the association-as compensation for their services-
without any personal or professional responsibility for the professional
services rendered. Clearly, this violates the judicial and professional
canons of ethics. °
Perhaps more objectionable than the possibility of sharing profits
with laymen is the possibility that laymen will control practitioners
in some of the professional associations. As noted, Georgia, Alabama,
and Pennsylvania permit unlicensed persons to be members of the
board or to serve as officers of the association.17' While the Georgia
statute does prohibit any lay employee's participation in the "prac-
tice" of the profession,'72 it would appear that such a restriction is
really too ambiguous to satisfy the basic objection. If such restric-
tions are applied technically, and the layman is only prohibited from
participating in decisions which concern the manner in which a
practitioner should offer professional services, then the layman is
given broad discretionary powers which can be used in the formation
of important policy decisions for the organization. When he may, in
addition, hire and dismiss employees, the extent of the layman's
control over practitioners is very substantial. In these situations,
then, the fear of a corruption of professional objectives by the un-
licensed may well be valid.
Before enactment of the professional incorporation statutes, one
court indicated that even if all officers, directors, and shareholders
were licensed, the corporation would still be against public policy.
The reason stated was that shares in the corporation would descend
to laymen on the death of a stockholder.' However, most of the
new statutes now preclude such a possibility by requiring that the
professional organization repurchase its stock from a deceased mem-
ber's estate;' or, in the alternative, the statutes at least empower
the organization to repurchase the stock.'
One criticism which may be levied against a few of the new
statutes is that they fail to go far enough in restricting transfers of
stock. For example, some statutes do not even authorize a first re-
109 See the cases cited note 161 supra where such practices were disapproved.
70 See ABA Canons of Professional Ethics and Judicial Ethics, Canon 34 (Rev. of
1957); Id., Opinion 8.
.. See the statutes cited note 167 supra.
'. Ga. Professional Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4303 (Supp. 1961).
13 See People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App.
354, 244 Pac. 1089, 1091 (1926).
.. E.g., Professional Corp. Act. § 15, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, S 815 (Supp. 1961).
Note the elaborate provisions, with forfeiture-type penalties, in the Kentucky statute.
Professional Serv. Corp. Act S 10, 3 P-H Corp. Serv. Ky. 114-15 (1962).
.. E.g., Medical Corp. Act § 17, 4 P-H Corp. Serv. S.D. 88 (1961).
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fusal type of restriction. ' Without the power to incorporate such a
provision, a firm or clinic could conceivably find itself with little
control over prospective shareholders. Because of the nature of pro-
fessional practice, it would seem desirable to allow current members
of an organization to control selection of new associates, especially
since a first refusal type restriction has no adverse tax consequences."
4. Objection
Because a corporation is a separate legal entity, it will not be
amenable to disciplinary action by a profession or by the state
boards for questionable conduct. 8
a. Treatment Under the Statutes.-Four "corporation" states per-
mit the state board to review certain actions of the corporation and,
if necessary, to suspend the certificate of registration.'' The same
four states require annual renewal of these certificates. Florida and
Wisconsin do not give the state boards any additional control over
professional corporations, however, they do cite as grounds for dis-
solution of such an organization the failure to dismiss promptly
any disqualified employee or shareholder.'8 ' The Oklahoma statute
requires a certificate of registration of a professional corporation
but specifies no grounds upon which the state board can base any
disciplinary action.''
Of the "association" states only Pennsylvania gives the state board
express authority to discipline the association itself.'8 ' While Con-
necticut and Tennessee do provide that the association is to be gov-
erned by the state laws regulating that profession, they fail to specify
178 See Tenn. UPA, Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-105 (3) (c) (Supp. 1962).
71 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (e) (2) (1960).
.78 See Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932); People
ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919); cf.
In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910) (No one can practice law
without taking the oath, thereby rendering himself subject to the discipline of the court,
and a corporation cannot take the oath.). See cases cited note 150 supra which hold that
ultimate control of the legal profession is in the judiciary and any attempt to authorize
undesirable forms is unconstitutional. See also Brydonjack v. State Bar of Calif., 208
Cal. 439, 281 Pac. 1018, 1020 (1929) (indicating the courts have final word on who
may practice law).
'.. Dental Corp. Act §§ 5-7, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 64-1805 to -1807 (Supp. 1961);
Medical Corp. Act § 5-7, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 64-1705 to -1707 (Supp. 1961); Conn.
Gen. Stat. 33-181 (Rev. of 1958, rev. to 1962); Minn. Professional Corp. Act §§ 7-8,
12, 20(1), 21, Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 319.07, .08, .12, .20(1), .21 (Supp. 1961); Medical
Corp. Act § 10, 4 P-H Corp. Serv. S.D. 87-88 (1961).
'S Professional Serv. Corp. Act § 10, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621.10 (Supp. 1961); Serv.
Corp. Act § 6, Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(6) (Supp. 1961).
... Professional Corp. Act, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 816 (Supp. 1961).
... Professional Ass'n Act § 4, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-4 (Supp. 1961). The
association is subject to the same rules and regulations of the state boards that a prac-
titioner is.
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which administrative bodies can enforce the pertinent laws."' Georgia
and Alabama require that an annual report listing current members
be sent to the Secretary of State;'.. in addition, under appropriate
circumstances that officer may recommend forfeiture proceedings to
the Attorney-General. 8' Ohio merely calls for an annual report to
the Secretary of State certifying that all employees are licensed;'
8 8
and the Illinois enactment just states that all practitioners shall re-
main under the jurisdiction of the state boards.8 ' Texas has no
related provision.
b. Comments.-Apprehension caused by the prospect of loss of
control over a professional organization by a profession or by state
boards is somewhat unjustified. Because of the degree of power over
individual practitioners presently held by the respective professions
and the state boards, there is little likelihood that a corporation as
an entity, or practitioners acting as individuals, can long engage in
unethical practices. Certainly, operation within a corporate frame-
work can be no excuse for unethical conduct by any individual.
Should such conduct occur, however, the corporate entity is no
impenetrable shield to recourse by a state board against that individ-
ual. Furthermore, the power exercised over individual practitioners
by the state boards and by the professions furnishes an effective
means of controlling the organizational entity since that organiza-
tion cannot long exist if its practitioners are disqualified to practice.
In addition, some states do require immediate removal of disqualified
shareholders and employees, or the professional association or pro-
fessional corporation forfeits its charter. '
Procedurally it will be more advantageous to state boards and
professional societies if they can deal tete tete with the professional
organizations, rather than having to discipline the organization by
reprimanding its employees. In some situations, e.g., unethical adver-
tising, it may be difficult to determine who in particular is respon-
sible for the wrongful act; however, if the state board or professional
society can impose sanctions against the organization itself, the
problem will be solved. 8 '
583Conn. Gen. Stat. § 34-82(3) (Rev. of 1958, rev. to 1962); Tenn. UPA, Tenn.
Code Ann. § 61-105(3) (Supp. 1962). The 1962 Arizona statute is similar. Professional
Corp. Act § 10-909(A), 2 P-H Corp. Serv. Ariz. 44 (1962).
184 Professional Ass'n Act § 12, 2 P-H Corp. Serv. Ala. 223-24 (1961); Ga. Professional
Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4313 (Supp. 1961).
'8" Professional Ass'n Act § 10, 2 P-H Corp. Serv. Ala. 223 (1961); Ga. Professional
Ass'n Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4311 (Supp. 1961).
188 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.06 (Page, Supp. 1961).
... Smith-Hurd Ill. Sess. Laws, 1961, ch. 106V2, § 105, at 432.
188 E.g., Arkansas and South Dakota. See nootnote 3 to the Chart supra.
.. See In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 354, 557-58 (Fla. 1961), where the Florida
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B. Summary Of The Objections
Of the four legal and ethical objections discussed, only one pre-
sents a formidable obstacle to the establishment of professional asso-
ciations and professional corporations. That objection concerns the
possible adverse effects the feature of limited liability may have upon
the practitioner-client relationship. The objection concerning an in-
ability to license a corporate entity because that entity is not a
natural person has been shown to be specious.' The problem re-
garding the sharing of control or profits with laymen is resolved by
permitting only licensed persons to own and manage the organiza-
tions, and by avoiding profit sharing plans with lay employees.
Finally, the objection in regard to the lack of disciplinary control
over a professional organization is not so serious that it cannot be
removed by additional legislation or by energetic action on the part
of the state boards and the professions in bringing that organization
under their control.' "
IV. CONCLUSION
The problems presented by professional associations and profes-
sional corporations fall into two main categories: taxation and pro-
fessional ethics. Tax problems mainly concern the establishment of
proper internal legal relationships in order to qualify for corporate
tax treatment, and also, the establishment of an employer-employee
relationship in order to qualify for pension and profit sharing plans.
Professional ethical problems consist of the necessity of avoiding
sharing of profits or management with laymen and the necessity of
maintaining individual and organizational responsiveness to each
client, i.e., preserving the practitioner-client relationship.
Placing ethical and tax considerations aside momentarily, the
necessity for or desirability of incorporation by practitioners will
largely depend on the attitudes of each profession. For example,
physicians have justifiable needs for capital for equipment and clini-
cal space; whereas lawyers are not as pressed by this need. However,
the present form of private collectivization and socialization may
lead to undesirable consequences in the form of similar federal col-
lectivization for physicians; whereas neither accountants nor lawyers
are faced with this prospect. Since professional societies control
Supreme Court brought the lawyers' professional service corporations within the scope
of the Florida Canons of Ethics. In a similar fashion, the Colorado Supreme Court made
a provision for organizations of lawyers in Colorado Supreme Court Rule 231.
... Except insofar as a licensing statute may affirmatively show a legislative intent to
exclude corporations.
... As in Florida and Colorado. See authorities cited note 189 supra.
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professional activities only within their respective states, attitudes
on acceptance will naturally vary, causing increasing diversity in
treatment and tax consequences throughout the country.
Even assuming approval by local professional societies, resolution
of all ethical problems, and satisfaction of the corporate tax re-
quirements, professional men still face obstacles which may well
make the corporation or association less desirable. A large array of
possible taxes face the organization, e.g., federal corporate taxes,
state corporate taxes, accumulated earnings taxes, personal holding
company taxes, and taxes on distributions on dissolution. Moreover,
the officers and dominant shareholders may find themselves saddled
with a much more formal type of organization than they really de-
sire, especially in a small organization, and ironically enough, a de-
ficiency in substantive state law governing an organization's internal
operations. Finally, if most states follow the Florida example and
take the new organizations under the jurisdiction of their state boards,
there may be additional regulations and formalities for the prac-
titioners to observe.
Cause for the new incorporation laws has been traced to the cur-
rent tax structure. The responsibility for the unfair treatment
accorded self-employed persons and for the diversity in tax con-
sequences now existing likewise may be laid at the doorstep of our
fiscal policymakers. Possibly an adequate Keogh-type enactment
would remove the discriminations and the accompanying need for
professional corporations. However, accepting the status quo, pro-
fessional men in some states may now be able to piece together a
method of obtaining tax equality, though there are enough blank
spots in the legal pattern to flag "caution" to even the enthusiastic.
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